THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT
TO CREATE
BROWARD COUNTY
IN 1913

by Cooper Kirk

The unsuccessful attempt to create Broward County from Dade and Palm Beach counties in 1913 had been preceded by an eight-year period of high expectations, some remarkable accomplishments, many disappointments and considerable judicial litigation. A consideration of some of the highlights and vicissitudes of these hectic years will illuminate and provide a context for an examination of the reasons for the attempt to create a new county, and for its failure, on the southeast coast of Florida extending from the Hillsboro River on the north to the Snake Creek on the south. It should be noted at the beginning of this examination that the topography of this "new county" area heavily contributed to the attempt and to the failure. More than any other, this area was impacted by an excess of swamps and overflowed lands, both of which features delayed and hampered settlement and development, but lands which held rich promise when drained and reclaimed.

Prior to 1905, the State of Florida had given away approximately twenty million acres of land, or more than one-half of the land of Florida, mostly to corporations as an incentive for them to construct railroads and canals. Thus, when Governor Napoleon B. Broward signed the Drainage Tax Law on May 27, 1905, levying a tax of five cents annually per acre for lands lying in the drainage district, plans were set in motion to drain and to reclaim the Everglades, much of which the railroads and canals laid claim to but had done nothing to develop. Many Floridians applauded the effort of Governor Broward to reclaim the vast wasteland, a gigantic undertaking, while others considered the drainage plan a pipe-dream by a reform-minded governor. But nine large corporations with claims to Everglades land, headed by the Florida East Coast Railway, set up an information bureau in Jacksonville to generate literature designed to turn Floridians in favor of drainage against it. Broward, however, boldly fought back by waging his own literature campaign. As expected, the corporations, whose 4,500,000 acres of Everglades and swamp lands had been in most cases an outright gift of the legislature for internal improvements, took the governor to the federal courts, which in late 1906 declared section two of the 1905 law unconstitutional.

In drawing up the 1905 drainage law, Governor Broward and the legislature anticipated corporate opposition and made provision for the drainage to proceed in the face of opposition. They secured the assistance of the United States Department of Agriculture, which eventually lent the State the services of Engineer J. O. Wright who drew up a competent plan for drainage and reclamation. In addition, by an overwhelming vote, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment by whose terms the State would have carte blanche authority to remove all obstacles to drainage and reclamation of the Everglades which constituted the drainage district. The legislature and governor also prepared a standby plan in case the proposed constitutional amendment failed and the court challenges succeeded. In case of failure, the indefinite language of section two of the 1905 drainage law would be replaced with language composed by ex-Governor W.S. Jennings. The corporations succeeded in the courts and the 1907 legislature passed a Revised Drainage Tax Law which withstood scrutiny by the courts. Whereupon the nine corporations in a signed agreement dropped their opposition to drainage, agreed to pay their arrears taxes and promised hereafter to cooperate with the State government.

Meanwhile the constitutional drainage amendment went down in overwhelming defeat. In a campaign which convulsed Floridians like nothing else since Civil War Reconstruction, Governor Broward and the opponents of Everglades drainage fought a bruising battle. Partially because of the well-financed program of the corporations who claimed Everglades lands, many
Floridians had become convinced that the drainage and reclamation of the Everglades was too vast an undertaking for one of the poorest states in the South. Broward and leading state legislators, however, fought valiantly for the constitutional amendment which would have insured the completion of the great work Broward had undertaken. But on November 8, 1906, the amendment went down to defeat statewide by an almost two to one majority. Even a majority of those living within the proposed drainage district voted against the amendment. While Fort Lauderdale and Pompano upheld the amendment by votes of 24 to 4 and 21 to 2, Dania and Miami voted against it by votes of 16 to 15 and 210 to 127. Fortunately for Everglades drainage, as noted above, the state legislature the next year passed a revised section two of the 1905 bill. Drainage then proceeded under the provisions of the revised 1907 bill.

Despite the litigation of the 1905 law in the courts, Governor Broward personally took charge of construction of two 105 by 38 foot drainage ditches on New River, located twenty-five miles north of the Bay of Biscayne. The Everglades was launched and began digging westward on the north fork of New River beginning at Sebace Creek on July 4, 1906. On April 1, 1907, the Okeechobee was launched and began digging westward on the south fork of New River. The objective of both ditches in general terms was to dig two sixty-foot wide and eight-foot deep drainage canals to Lake Okeechobee which engineers assured Governor Broward would be almost adequate to drain the ‘Glades for settlement. Broward put the whole drainage operation under the superintendency of localite

Everglades drainage operations began at Sebace Creek on the New River, just north of the present State Road 84 bridge over the river’s South Fork. From this spot, marked with a circle, the dredge Everglades cut the North New River Canal (marked “Drainage Canal” on this map) into the ‘Glades (map by Kenneth J. Hughes).

Reed A. Bryan, then twenty-nine years old and a member of a politically powerful family. Governor Broward and State cabinet members, who composed the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund which controlled State lands, early had been advised that four smaller canals of approximately six miles in length could complete a canal system adequate to reclaim the Everglades provided that individual land owners cut lateral canals and ditches to connect with the State constructed canals. It was the failure to fully implement the latter provision which more than any other matter slowed, and often prevented adequate drainage, which in turn resulted in the Everglades never being fully drained or reclaimed.

The opening of southeast Florida to settlement, a process begun by the completion of the F.E.C. Railway to Miami, and accelerated by the Everglades reclamation project of the 1900s and 1910s, doomed the governmental unity of the region as residents of Dade County’s far-flung and diverse communities sought political autonomy and convenient access to governing institutions. The longstanding division between Biscayne Bay and Lake Worth interests was formalized in 1909 with the creation by the latter of Palm Beach County.

At the same time, the concentration of Everglades drainage efforts and related land sales in the vicinity of New River fostered a spirit of self-determination which crystallized in early 1913 when Fort Lauderdale civic leaders began efforts to create a county of their own. The resulting struggle monopolized area politics for the remainder of the year and was closely intertwined with a number of other controversial issues of the day. Although this initial effort failed, it lay the groundwork for the successful attempt to create Broward County two years later.

Overshadowed by the achievement of 1915, this first endeavor to carve out a new county centered around Fort Lauderdale and extending deep into the Everglades has been largely overlooked in accounts of the area’s history. Using a wide variety of primary sources, including government documents and a myriad of contemporary newspaper accounts, Broward County Historian Cooper Kirk has traced the origins of the movement to create the county, reconstructed its progress and demise, and analyzed a number of related issues, including Everglades drainage and land sales, Prohibition, and deep water harbor construction. A brief summary of this article, entitled “The Failure to Create Broward County: 1913,” appeared in the Summer/Fall 1988 issue of Broward Legacy.
Under the passionate leadership of Governor Broward, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund intended to build a total of six dredges for drainage and to finance all their operations through two means. The 1907 drainage law would provide a tax of five cents per acre annually on the property in the drainage district which would be the seed money for all operations. This tax applied to the State's 3,000,000 acres in the district. In addition, with the money derived from the sale of State-drained lands in the district added to the annual tax, the trustees expected and advertised at least verbally that the drainage and reclamation of the Everglades would be completed in 1910. Furthermore, Governor Broward hired as special counsel, ex-governor W. S. Jennings, to institute legal proceedings to reclaim for the State all of the land acquired as land grants for internal improvement by corporations, all of whom had not fulfilled the improvement obligation. Jennings' efforts more often than not were successful. Consequently, the State had a huge reservoir of Everglades land for sale. To prevent disappointment by purchasers and possible litigation, the State reasonably adhered to its policy to sell land and to deliver a deed for the same only in the areas where dredging operations had been completed or else were fully underway.

The first large sale of Everglades land by the State occurred in the second week of June 1908, when R. P. Davie and his business partner J. R. McKinnie, both of Colorado Springs, Colorado, purchased 28,000 acres located in Townships 51 and 52 South and Ranges 41 and 42 East. Davie and McKinnie were vice-president and president respectively of the Colorado-based Western Sugar and Land Company whose vast sugar beet enterprise employed hundreds of colonized laborers. Upon the purchase of this vast acreage, which amounted to over forty-three square miles of rich muck land, Davie and McKinnie organized the Everglades Sugar and Land Company with a capitalization of $1,000,000, to manage their land operations. They intended to plant sugar cane and also to operate an experimental farm to determine what other crops could be grown on reclaimed Everglades soil. Although later land purchases exceeded in size the Davie-McKinnie acquisition, none proved as successful as a farming operation. By August 7, 1908, Davie had engaged John M. Bryan, Jr., to put the experimental farm into operation, which Bryan did in short order with the assistance of 100 laborers. At the same time subcontractor Thomas M. Bryan, a brother of Reed and a cousin of John Bryan, had more than half completed a two-mile lateral canal through the Davie property and the canal emptied into the South New River Canal. That Davie, McKinnie and associates intended to do more than to farm sugar cane and to operate an experimental farm is made evident by their charter which prescribed their corporation could also sell, lease, own, mortgage, convey and hold land, operate canals and make all improvements necessary for a successful venture.

While the Davie land purchase initially brought some needed money into the drainage operation, like other land purchasers Davie only paid for the land in small portions, that is, as he sold land to settlers. Also, dredging operations were proceeding slowly in late 1908, as Broward's term of office drew to a close. Part of the trouble was that the State built and operated the dredges, and in this area the State did not have much expertise. The record reveals that Broward accomplished little in actually dredging canals for when he left office on January 1, 1909, only a total of 13.24 miles had been dug, 6.52 miles on the North New River Canal and 6.72 miles on the South New River Canal.

Governor Broward had high political ambitions for a national office, and in the pursuance of his ambition he met a man who in fact saved Broward's plans for drainage of the Everglades. In mid-1908 things looked gloomy for the continuance of Everglades drainage, for Albert W. Gilchrist, the leading candidate to succeed Broward as governor, saw little future for drainage because of the lack of money and the opposition expressed in the defeat of the constitutional amendment. On the other hand, William J. Bryan looked like a shoo-in for the presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention being held in Denver, Colorado, in mid June 1908. Whereupon, Broward went to the convention and unsuccessfully campaigned there for the second place on the Bryan ticket. Although Broward failed to further his political ambition for national office, he made a connection at the convention which saved Everglades drainage and at the same time boosted his reputation within the state. At the convention R. P. Davie introduced Broward to Richard J. Bolles, already a "Colorado Silver King," a western land developer extraordinaire and as bold and far-seeing an entrepreneur as Florida has ever seen.

With some reputed millions to invest in high risk ventures, Bolles fell under

Rare photograph of Governor Napoleon B. Broward in the Everglades.

Superintendent of Everglades Drainage Reed A. Bryan of Fort Lauderdale, in a c. 1903 portrait.
the magnetism and succumbed to the charisma of Broward and offered to purchase over 500,000 acres of Everglades land still under water and to assume full responsibility for draining the vast acreage. This offer appealed to Broward for it would get the State out of the drainage business. But, getting wind of the proposed Bolles deal, Attorney-General W. H. Ellis, like Broward a trustee of the Internal Improvement Fund, publicly announced in mid-October 1908, that he would not sign the necessary papers to consummate a deal for $1.00 an acre when the land was actually worth twenty times as much. Broward, however, was getting desperate, although to put the best face on things he reported that land sales were on the upswing. In Miami on November 6th Broward announced that since June 4th the State had sold a total of 114,568 acres, the largest purchase being for 80,000 acres. All these land sales were located between Fort Lauderdale and Miami. But in such large land deals money came into the State coffers slowly for purchasers made very low down payments and only paid for the land as they sold it.

Governor Broward's intense apprehension that his gubernatorial successors would not embrace Everglades drainage passionately enough to overcome persistent criticism that the world's greatest drainage project was nothing more than a huge boondoggle in which reckless entrepreneurs and innocent investors alike would lose everything, ended eight days before the governor left office. On December 23, 1908, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund signed a comprehensive contract with Richard J. Bolles for the purchase of 508,000 acres of Everglades land at $1.00 per acre. But to keep the dredges digging, the contract also specified that Bolles would pay $1.00 additional per acre, which payments would be placed into a special drainage fund and would be expended only for drainage and reclamation purposes. Bolles agreed to advance the Trustees $50,000 to keep drainage operations afloat. In addition, Bolles agreed to pay $50,000 "cash in hand" on January 1st in the years 1910 to 1914, and $100,000 on January 1, 1915, then $200,000 on January 1st each succeeding year until full payment was made for the 508,000 acres specified in the contract and located solely in Dade county. On the other side of the ledger, the State agreed that after each payment it would give Bolles a "good and sufficient deed" for the land he had paid for under the contract. In addition, the State agreed to construct four specified canals on the eastern coast and to lower Lake Okeechobee four feet, which meant the State intended to drain and reclaim the Everglades as rapidly as practical. This latter matter became of prime importance when years later land purchasers claimed Bolles had promised their land would be completely drained two years from the date of their land purchase. Bolles successfully pleaded, and the State officials backed him, that he had no control on the speed with which drainage would be accomplished, that this was a matter the State had reserved for itself.

A matter not thought to be of great significance in the contract at the signing later became of surpassing importance. To feed Bolles' financial mill, the State expedited the issuance of "good and sufficient deeds," so that Bolles could furnish a good deed to purchasers. But the contract with Bolles stated that the State would hold a first mortgage on all the land Bolles sold unless he paid for the entire 508,000 acres listed in the contract. In 1907 the State had revised its official map of the Everglades and any land lying within the mapped section of southern Florida became subject to the annual five cents per acre drainage tax. In years to come the State had a double claim to Everglades land sold by Bolles. If any of the terms of the contract were not met by Bolles or purchasers of land from Bolles, the land in question would be escheated to the State. And any defalcation of the drainage tax would land Bolles and purchasers in the same boat. Bolles, however, was not singled out for special treatment, for essentially the same terms applied to other purchasers of Everglades land.

Immediately after his purchase of the 508,000 acres, Bolles organized and owned the Florida Fruitlands Company and sold to this company 180,000 acres, which it was expected would be the first to be drained and reclaimed by the State. This 241 square miles sold by Bolles extended from just north of Miami to opposite Lantana, and was located just east of the proposed Miami Canal which the State intended to construct from Miami to Lake Okeechobee. From his headquarters in Kansas City, Missouri, Bolles hired a public relations firm for $400,000 to spread the gospel of economic and productive Everglades land to be had for a pittance. This company hired agents for Bolles throughout the north central, mid-western and mountain states. The agents most generally set up offices and sold Florida Fruitlands Company land on a commission basis.

While the Florida Fruitlands Company brochures stated the company stood behind everything printed in them, they added a disclaimer as to what enthusiastic salesmen might claim in order to make a sale. The company divided its holdings into ten-acre plots, enough land calculated to make the purchaser a self-sufficient farmer. To supply the large enterpriser and the speculator, however, the company divided a small portion of its vast mileage into twenty acre plots and multiples of twenty up to 640 acres. Generally the land went for either $20 or $24 per acre, payable in twenty-four monthly payments interest free. Thus for either $220 or $240 a farmer could acquire from the company sufficient acreage of the "world's richest soil" to enable him and his family to live comfortably in the world's "most desirable climate." Compared to most other land companies, Florida Fruitlands offered the lowest price and the easiest terms, for some Everglades land went for up to $80 an acre with a substantial down payment. Yet, in fairness to other land companies, it must be said that some of them offered land much closer to settlements than did Fruitlands, and in some cases purchasers secured land with lateral ditches, but not dikes, already in place.

Although other land development companies beside the Davie-McKinnie combine had purchased from the State Everglades holdings for exploitation before Bolles came on the scene, Bolles'

Workers standing by the boom of the dredge Everglades, excavating the North New River Canal, c. 1907.
acquisition acted as a catalyst for other substantial purchases. The Tatum Brothers of Miami added acreage to the 30,000 they already owned. In early 1909, R. P. Davie formed the Davie Realty Company, absorbed the J. R. McKinnie and associates holdings, then steadily added to his holdings, and in December of that year the Davie Realty Company sold 46,080 acres to the newly-formed Everglades Land and Sales Company headquartered initially in Kansas City, Missouri. Powered by Vice-President H. G. Ralston and Director Victor W. Helms of Chicago, this company accelerated the development of the really valuable Davie Experimental Farm by digging canals, by installing huge suction pumps, and by the spring of 1910 had located enthusiastic settlers on the farm from all over the United States. Raising its sights even higher, the Everglades Land and Sales Company purchased the 25,000 acre Royal Palm site contiguous on the west and sold ten acre farm plots. Eventually, this company became the premier developer of land west of Dania and Fort Lauderdale along the North and South New River canals. The experimental farm and adjacent lands eventually became Zona and then Davie, Florida, Sparked by either Bolles’ daring or faith, the somnolent Florida Fibre Company caught fire. Headed by Florida’s future United States Senator Duncan U. Fletcher of Jacksonville, the fibre company had purchased over 1,310 acres in 1899-1891, located between the forks of Middle River and had unsuccessfully tried to raise and process the sissal plant. When the Flagler railroad came through in 1896, the company platted the community of Progresso from part of its land, but company affairs languished until brought to life by Bolles’ venture. As a consequence, in September 1909, the fibre company took a new lease on life. It put its lands on the market, hired salesmen and widely advertised its lands as being adjacent to the “Garden of Eden” created on the Fort Lauderdale beach by capitalist-lawyer Hugh T. Birch of Chicago, and “Hon. Thomas E. Watson of Georgia, the great historian and political leader.”

After the businessman and “old timers” of Miami aborted an attempt in 1907 to create Palm Beach County from northern Dade County, citizens in the proposed county continued their flight and won the support of State Senator Fred M. Hudson of Miami. People living in the northern part of Dade County had powerful arguments for a new county, for Dade County in 1907 contained over 5,400 square miles and was larger than the State of Connecticut. Local needs could be better met by local government, they argued. In 1909, the legislature bought their argument and created Palm Beach County, effective July 1st. The new county took one-half of the land of Dade County and extended from just south of Pompano to St. Lucie Inlet. Meantime Everglades land sales boomed and, at the creation of Palm Beach County, Dade County Tax Assessor Captain J. T. Jaudon announced the assessed valuation of both Palm Beach and Dade counties to be $6,968,988; $871,957 of which had been added during the past year. During this year the State had sold 500,003.57 acres to Richard J. Bolles; 6,423.13 acres to Walter R. Comfort; 14,000 acres to the Wisner Land Company and approximately 53,000 acres to P.A. Vans Agnew. Most of these lands lay in the new county of Palm Beach and their sale accounted for almost all the increased valuation.

As Bolles and other land entrepreneurs increased their sales to citizens living for the most part in the northern half of the United States, complaints of fraud began to become public, and northern newspapers ran sensational stories of simple, patriotic citizens being cheated by fraudulent methods and by slick salesmen and their principle employers. Land speculators or developers heard themselves being denounced as those who sold land not by the acre but “by the gallon,” a vivid reminder that the drainage of the Everglades had hardly begun. Out of state contingents and individuals who were prospective land purchasers arrived in Fort Lauderdale and Miami by the railroad carloads to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of Everglades lands offered for sale. For the most part their inspection consisted of being taken up New River and Miami River by company representatives in company launches, given an on-the-spot spiel, then returned to their respective lodgings. The next day the chief Miami newspaper interviewed them, and the paper invariably only printed the favorable and highly laudatory responses.

In early 1910, an out-of-office Governor Broward in need of ready cash lent his name to overblown land companies’ advertisements. And, in fact, the ex-governor conducted sales tours into the Everglades in a Bolles company launch. As 1910 wore on, Broward began to heat up his race for the United States Senate. Word began to seep out to the public about Broward’s land dealings, which in later times would have caused a scandal and probably driven him from the race. But Broward in Miami and elsewhere in the state met the accusation of his opponents head on and did not flinch. On the public platform Broward admitted that he did indeed own 27,000 acres of Everglades land given to him by Richard J. Bolles. Although Broward could usually successfully defend himself, in this case he received timely aid from R. P. Davie, who publicly asserted that Bolles had given Broward the 27,000 acres out of gratitude for Broward’s introducing him to the sale of Everglades land on good terms.

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1901 painting of Richard J. Bolles, largest Everglades landowner of the early twentieth century (courtesy of The Bolles School).
This vast acreage immeasurably assisted Broward's financially hard-pressed family after the triumphant senatorial candidate died on October 1, 1910, a few months before he was slated to be sworn in as one of Florida's two senators. About a decade later Broward's widow realized a net profit of $167,500 from the sale of this land.

As an entity which cashed in on Broward's land sales endorsement, Don Farnsworth and Associates of Chicago cut a swash-buckling figure. Farnsworth advertisements blared forth that his company had "handled" 300,000 acres of land, had operated in eleven states during the past four years and was even now in the process of opening forty offices in various cities of the United States. While Farnsworth customarily sold Everglades land in twenty acre plots for $1,600, or $80 an acre, he sweetened the deal by offering ridiculously easy terms and stretching out interest free payments over a ten year period. But his clincher consisted of offering to deliver free to each purchaser "a three-room bungalow, a neat house complete with plans, specifications and lumber ready to set up." Farnsworth, R. P. Davie and Victor W. Helms of the Everglades Land and Sales Company appear to have had some common interests for all three operated along the North and South New River canals and they offered buyers an interest in the Davie Experimental Farm located on the south canal in Davie. But Farnsworth in the company of ex-governor Broward began a feature that Bolles and other land speculators later emulated. He established the Waverly subdivision in Fort Lauderdale in 1910 and either sold or gave away town home lots to Everglades land purchasers. Farnsworth acknowledged his indebtedness to Broward when he publicly asserted that Broward had selected the site for the beautiful Waverly community.

As the number of land speculators or developers increased in number so did their advertisements increase in spewing forth unfulfillable promises. Consequently, non-Florida newspapers increased their condemnation of Everglades land sales practices and they brought to the attention of the public specific cases of land fraud or at least sales abuse. Except for some very hardy souls indeed, purchasers of Everglades land could not live on their ten-acre plots because the uncompleted drainage canals hardly made a dent in the vast amount of water which covered the 'Glades for much of the year. Scoffers of drainage claimed that even when the canals were completed to Lake Okeechobee they would be wholly inadequate to handle the volume of water which flowed from the lake and also the vast quantity of rainfall which fell in the 'Glades between the lake and the ocean. Some of the immediate problems connected with drainage rested with the State of Florida whose State-constructed dredges and State drainage personnel did not have either the capacity or the expertise to operate the world's largest drainage and reclamation project efficiently. In the eyes of the experts in drainage adequate drainage could only be achieved if the whole project was placed in the hands of professional drainage personnel. Certainly the State had acted in an irresponsible manner in view of the prospects it held forth to prospective settlers that the drainage project would be complete before the settlers had completed their payments for their acreage. For during the eighteen months from January 1, 1909, to June 30, 1910, the State had dug only 15.84 miles of canals, and since dredging began in 1906, the total

Drawing of one of the free bungalows offered by Don Farnsworth and Associates to purchasers of twenty-acre Everglades plots. These houses, located in present-day Davie, were the first to be built on reclaimed Everglades land.
miles of canals dug was less than thirty out of a projected total canal system of well over 200 miles.

The State of Florida muted much of the onus cast upon it for its dilatoriness by turning over the chief part of the Everglades drainage project in mid-1910 to the Furst-Clark Construction Company of Baltimore, Maryland, a company with a proven track record for getting big jobs done on time. Concurrent with its Everglades drainage work the company would continue the dredging of the Cape Cod Canal in Massachusetts from Barnstable Bay to Buzzard's Bay, an undertaking, however, dwarfed by the 'Glades contract. Frank A. Furst, president of the company, admitted the contract signed with the State of Florida on June 15, 1910, which called for the completion of Everglades drainage within three years or by July 1, 1913, had raised eyebrows, but he was confident of success. Furst declared that the Everglades drainage project was the largest work of its kind in the United States. His company, he said, must dig 184 miles of canals sixty feet wide and ten feet deep, one-third of it through coral rock covered with a layer of soft mud. A total of 25,000,000 cubic yards of rock and mud would have to be removed at a cost to the State of from $3,000,000 to $4,000,000. As a part of the deal, Furst-Clark would purchase from the State four dredges for $145,000. When completed, Everglades drainage would drain some 6,000,000 acres of land, a territory that equaled the combined size of the states of Connecticut, Delaware and Rhode Island. Showing that it meant business, shortly after it commenced work on July 1, 1910, Furst-Clark placed some of its work on a twenty-four hour basis in order to complete its contract on time on the five canals it had contracted for. Later, the State awarded contracts to other companies to dig the West Palm Beach Canal and several short canals of approximately six miles in length and which flowed into the ocean along the lower east coast.

As the digging of canals accelerated after mid-1910, land entrepreneurs sped up their sale of water-logged acreage. Their advertisements made it plain that the State of Florida had guaranteed to drain and to reclaim the Everglades, and when publicly charged by newspapers and land purchasers with land fraud for selling undrained land, or when pleading their case in the federal courts, the speculators invariably denied fraud on the valid claim that the State of Florida had put its faith and credit on the line when it sold Everglades land and gave "sufficient deeds" for the same. No doubt land purchasers did not always read, or else misunderstood, the fine print in the land sales contracts, and this led to acrimonious charges which could rarely be proved in the courts.

With such a raft of land sales advertisements, and with so much coming and going into the Everglades for inspection by prospective and actual buyers, combined with a nation-wide network of land sales offices, it might be assumed that the population of Dade County increased rapidly after Governor Broward began drainage operations in 1905. Such was not the case, however, for in 1905 Dade County, which then included Palm Beach County, boasted a cosmopolitan population of 12,089, and in 1910 the combined population of Dade and Palm Beach counties only totaled 17,510, most of whom lived outside the few incorporated communities. The predominance of population increase on the farms points up the fact that Dade Countians made their living mainly by following agricultural pursuits. The only two incorporated towns of any size in 1905 were Miami and West Palm Beach, and in the five year period to 1910, these communities only had increased in population from 4,733 to 5,471 and 3,511 to 3,844 respectively. As for the communities which would later be in Broward County when it was created in 1915, they likewise showed an unimpressive population growth from the time Everglades drainage began until it was put in the hands of drainage experts. In 1905, Fort Lauderdale precinct had a population of 219, Dania 193, Deerfield seventy-eight, Pompano seventy-three, and Hallandale and Ojus combined 228. The Thirteenth United States Census of 1910, vividly revealed the slow growth of these same communities or precincts, for Fort Lauderdale only had increased to a population of 296, Dania 283, Deerfield 287, Pompano 350 and Hallandale minus Ojus had a population of 245 inhabitants. Whether the large percentage-wise increase of Deerfield and Pompano precincts resulted because they were now in Palm Beach County and the size of the precincts had been enlarged, has not yet been determined. Although by 1910 only Pompano and Dania of the future Broward County communities had incorporated, the population in all three communities or precincts included the inhabitants both in the communities and the nearest outlying areas.

In addition to the soil and climate, the prohibition movement affected the pattern and rate of population growth on the southeast Florida frontier during the period under consideration. Built around a moral core and fueled by both emotion and economic concerns, the prohibition movement exerted influence for several decades. Forces propelling the prohibition cause redoubled their efforts nationally and locally particularly during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Proponents believed grass roots enthusiasm and hard work would result in local options for prohibition, states would follow by becoming "dry," and eventually enough states would support a constitutional amendment to prohibit the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. The emotionally laden contests between "wets" and "drys" often forged alliances whose residual influences could be harnessed in behalf of causes diverse indeed from prohibition.

In the spirited referendum campaign over prohibition in Dade County in the fall of 1907, many prominent citizens publicly espoused the dry cause. The Dade County Prohibition League boasted as chairman Fred M. Hudson, state senator of Brevard, St. Lucie and Dade counties, and Alabamian S. Bobo Dean, publisher of the dominant The Miami Metropolis newspaper, as a member of the executive committee. The several Women Christian Temperance Unions joined the league in sponsoring the appearance of local and national speakers and in obtaining testimonials from prominent men and women, even some with a national reputation. The Miami Metropolis printed testimonials from officials and prominent citizens from cities outside of Florida who testified to the great economic and moral benefits prohibition had brought to their city. Crime had decreased, drunks were no longer in evidence on the streets and public places, lives had been rehabilitated and industry had boomed, asserted the alien prohibitionists. On the local scene, Fort Lauderdale's part-time resident Thomas E. Watson, of national fame, wrote Editor Dean a testimonial favoring prohibition and stated among other arguments that: "I have no hesitation in saying that the driving out of whiskey and the vice and crime which are its inseparable companions, Dade County would certainly not be less attractive than it is now to such men as myself visiting your section." But testimonials and speeches did not prevail in the October 15th referendum between the wets and the drys, for the former triumphed by twenty-five votes, although the contest would have been much closer had Fort Lauderdale's vote of twenty-two drys and three wets been counted instead.
of being disallowed because the election inspectors failed to fill out the election return properly. A plus for the truce was that they could look forward to the day when Palm Beach County would be created, which would remove from Dade County a heavy wet vote from West Palm Beach.

With the exodus of Palm Beach County in 1909, the wet and dry forces tangled again in November 1909. After a hotter contest than that of 1907, the total vote again and this time by a forty-four vote majority. Two factors of considerable weight came to light and were emphasized by the dry forces in explaining their defeat. First, Miami's vote was the controlling factor in the wet victory. Miami contained four precincts and together they cast a majority for the wet cause of 124 votes. But in no other precinct in Dade County other than North Miami did the wet win by more than four votes. Fort Lauderdale, Dania and Hallandale, the only communities remaining in northern Dade County after Deerfield and Pompano went with Palm Beach County, voted dry by a majority of sixty-six to forty-one. Second, in addition to tipping the electoral scale in favor of the wet cause, Miami was the only community in which a substantial number of Negroes voted. This further chilled the whites against the blacks. The Miami Metropolis headlined "The Miami Negro Decided Saturday's Contest." In developing its story the Metropolis employed considerable guess work as to how Negroes voted, evident in its statement that "... it is generally conceded that the large negro votes carried the election wet, there being in the neighborhood of 125 negro votes, and it is safe to estimate that half the negroes voted wet at all." A residue of bitterness against the City of Miami, and Miami Negroes in general for their defeat, remained with many of the proponents of prohibition, and they vowed to keep up the fight to make Dade County dry.

With the exception of Bolles' Florida Fruitlands Company, no land company advertised more widely, sold more property and brought in at their own expense more prospective purchasers of Everglades land, than did the Everglades Land Sales Company, whose land sold from $50 to $100 per acre depending on its location. Beginning in 1910, this company, under the energetic leadership of director Victor W. Helms, purchased additional land as it sold to eager buyers and increased its sales force, particularly in Illinois and Indiana, and more specially in Chicago. In November 1910 advertisement the company asserted that northerners, easterners and westerners had purchased a total of 25,000 Everglades farms, and the reason was that value of Everglades soil. Some farmers wanted to get in on the return of from $500 to $1,000 per acre, far above the national average, and throughout Dade County farm income averaged $469 per acre, a figure much above the national average.

Helms stated his own company had prospered and it was even then installing powerful pumps to serve the seventy square miles of Everglades land it had already sold. His own company now controlled 70,000 acres of the best located lands in the Everglades. Helms pointed out that his company had greatly benefitted Fort Lauderdale, Dania and Hallandale for its lands were located principally along the North and South New River canals and west of these three communities.

By mid-1910 people had begun to hail Fort Lauderdale as "The Gateway to the Everglades," for both the Bolles land and the Helms controlled property would be most accessible, as would be Lake Okeechobee itself, through the North and South New River canals whose eastern entrepot was Fort Lauderdale. Monthly hundreds of prospective settlers from beyond Florida boarded boats at Fort Lauderdale for a tour and inspection of Everglades land. Much of the time three out of four of these inquirers purchased either a ten or a twenty acre farmsite on easy terms, and some purchased the same amounts for their stay-at-home neighbors. But as the population figures already cited for 1910 reveal, most of the purchasers returned home to wait for the Everglades drainage operation to progress to the point where their land was sufficiently drained so homes could be built and farming operations begun full-scale. Although small in absolute terms, Dade County's population, nevertheless, did increase 280 percent from 1905 to 1910, compared to an increase of 42.1 percent for the State of Florida during the same period.

When land companies sold Everglades land they certified to the purchaser that the land had not been surveyed. This meant that purchasers only had a claim to the portion of the land which was surveyed land whose exact location would await an official survey, something the State of Florida promised would come at the earliest possible moment. But purchasers clamored for an exact location of their land so as to begin farming operations at once. Early on the Florida Fruitlands Company revealed it would conduct a lottery of its 180,000 acres on March 11, 1911, at Progresso, the new community the company would begin about one-half mile north of the recognized limits of Fort Lauderdale. In March purchasers would be given a more exact location of their Everglades land, although still a location not yet surveyed by the State. In addition they would be given gratis a twenty-five or fifty foot house lot in Progresso, the subdivision recently purchased by Bolles from the Florida Fibre Company, and enlarged by other land purchases. Thus, purchasers who wished to farm their Everglades plot, which had not as yet been completely drained, could build a house in Progresso and either travel to their farm each day or else build a "lean-to" and stay on the farm under very adverse conditions. With its 12,000 small and medium-sized lots, Progresso could furnish homesteads for the same number of purchasers. In planning the Progresso community, the Florida Fruitlands Company had made ample reservations for churches, schools, and other public buildings. From the 12,000 purchasers of Everglades land from Bolles' Florida Fruitlands Company, company officials expected anywhere from 3,000 to 4,000 would attend the lottery and that some would remain to build on their Progresso lot and would commence farming operations on their farms located over twenty-five miles west of Progresso. In anticipation of the land lottery, which was announced in December 1910, and subsequent developments, prominent Fort Lauderdale men began to organize and expand various operations which hitherto had been somewhat haphazardly conducted. In December 1910, Cromartie and Berryhill opened their big general store and joined the Oliver Brothers in this trade. Some "Fort Lauderdale Folks" organized the Commercial Club, forerunner of the Board of Trade, itself the predecessor of the Chamber of Commerce. Speculator Don Farnsworth and Associates of Chicago in January 1911 built the fifty-room Osceola Hotel on Brickell Avenue to handle their own clients and others who might need accommodations. At nine o'clock on the morning of February 1, 1911, the Fort Lauderdale State Bank opened as the town's first financial institution, capitalized at $15,000.

J. L. Billingsley, owner of one of Miami's 290 registered cars, respected attorney and vice-president of the Florida Fruitlands Company and a director of the new bank, "motored up to Fort Lauderdale with a potato sack full of money to make change with," on the morning of the first. Even in the Lilliputian society of Fort Lauderdale some men had risen to the top. So, respected men such as Frank
Location of Progresso in relation to present-day Fort Lauderdale streets (map by Kenneth J. Hughes).
Stranahan, Frank R. Oliver, H. G. Wheeler, Frederick A. Barrett and Thomas M. Bryan joined Billingsley as directors of the new bank which seems to have been heavily supported by Bolles and his company. Colonel George G. Mathews of Bartow, Ocala, and other places came to Fort Lauderdale in January 1911, ready to begin a second newspaper which would offer competition to barrister-educator William Heine's Fort Lauderdale Herald which had begun operations late in 1910.

Meanwhile the Commercial Club had evolved into the Fort Lauderdale Board of Trade and during the first week of February 1911, it appointed a committee to plan for the incorporation of Fort Lauderdale. At the March 2nd meeting of the board whose membership had risen to 102, the board "decided to incorporate as soon as possible and a committee consisting of W. H. Marshall, H. G. Wheeler, Frank Stranahan and J. L. Billingsley was authorized to take steps necessary to complete the incorporation." The next morning the committee posted notices which called for a meeting of all parties interested in incorporation for March 27th. The inchoate political situation which had prevailed in Fort Lauderdale for years crystalized, and with incorporation Fort Lauderdale took the political leadership of northern Dade County, and its influence even extended to Deerfield and Pompano, then located in Palm Beach County.

As Everglades drainage proceeded feature articles about the operations appeared in northern and western newspapers and periodicals, and government officials added their voice of praise to the undertaking. In February 1911 the Philadelphia Public Ledger asserted the drainage and reclamation of the Everglades "ranks with the greatest reclamation work done east of the Mississippi." The Ledger stated federal engineers predicted that within four or five years large steamboats would traverse the Everglades from the ocean to the gulf, and when the Panama Canal was completed the Florida transstate canal route through the Caloosahatchee River would become one of the United States' great waterways, for it would be utilized by vessels, at least coasters, both to and from the Panama Canal because it would save some 300 miles of navigation around the dangerous keys of southern Florida. Simultaneously, Dr. H. W. Wiley, Chief Chemist of the United States Department of Agriculture, was asked by Secretary James Wilson to visit the Everglades and to make a report thereon. After the visit, Wiley reported to the secretary that nowhere in the world was there such a body of land containing such remarkable possibilities of development than did the Everglades. In his own words Wiley reported that "this land affords promise of development which reaches beyond the limits of prophecy." In commenting upon Wiley's laudatory report, the Ledger lamented: "Unfortunately, the people of the North, generally, have no conception of the magnitude of the work [of drainage and reclamation]."

As March 11, 1911, the date set for the opening day of the land lottery, approached, southeast Floridians began to organize on a scale they never before had attempted. J. L. Billingsley, counsel and head of operations for the Florida Fruitlands Company, stated that every mail brought news from the mid-west that another Pullman was leaving for Fort Lauderdale, and men in touch with the situation estimated that a crowd from 2,000 to 6,000 would arrive. Sheriff Dan Hardie prepared his deputies for the work of policing the crowd "from crooks and rogues," and they would also guard the new state bank where special arrangements had been made for the storage of visitors' valuables. The post office department trained personnel to systematize the serving of the huge crowd. At a mass meeting of Fort Lauderdale citizens, committees were appointed to handle hundreds of details. A canvass ensued to find every available bed in the town and environs. Stores laid in a supply of extra provisions and the three principal hotels prepared for enormous crowds. The land company obtained two "circus tents" in which to stage the general meetings, and it also secured two railroad cars of small tents "for sleeping apartments for the contract holders." Citizens rose to the occasion and promised to furnish cots by the hundreds, but topping everyone was Joe O'Neill, proprietor of the new hardware store, who promised the use of 300 cots.

Disappointment and no little chagrin reigned when March 11th arrived and only 1,000 contract holders had arrived in Fort Lauderdale. Train delays occasioned by the railway union personnel strictly adhering to union rules as regards hours of labor received the blame for the foul up in plans. A good deal of grumbling on another matter by the early arrivals alerted company officials who sought to allay suspicions and reasons for complaint. No one grumbled over the Everglades land per se. Complaints revolved about two matters, one of which the land company could remedy and the other over which it had no ameliorative power. The matter of too many lots for business in relation to residences in Progresso could easily be adjusted. But the company had no answer to the complaint that Progresso was separated by too many miles from the Everglades land which belonged to the contract holders. The company did make a concession by allocating much more land to Progresso along the Florida East Coast Canal, a waterway the holders would have to utilize in order to get to their Everglades farms, farms which the individual could not as yet learn the exact location. But ex-Governor W. S. Jennings, closely connected with the Florida Fruitlands Company, in a speech calmed many fears. He pointed

Tent city at Progresso, 1911.
Everglades property of the Florida Fruitlands Company, shown in relation to the Everglades drainage canals and major east coast towns (map by Kenneth J. Hughes).
out that the Everglades land would soon be surveyed by the State but for the present it was not possible for purchasers to locate the precise site they would eventually get.

It was indeed a motley crowd that gathered in the piney woods of roadless Progresso in early March 1911. J. H. Reese of The Miami Metropolis described the variegated assemblage for his readers and in part his description ran:

They are all sorts and conditions of men in the crowd, running in dress and appearance from the city-bred chap with a flamboyant necktie to the old hayseed of the west with amber screenlots trickling down from the corners of his mouth and clad in keeping with this untidy sign of careless habit.

Before the official lottery proceedings began and during their continuance the crowd had its minds taken off the discomforts attendant upon their primitive way of life in Progresso and environs by the almost continuous auction of Fort Lauderdale lots which took place on a platform located in the midst of the tents. Most generally, purchasers to expedite matters only put down five dollars on their purchase, but a more substantial payment was due before the buyer left Fort Lauderdale. In particular, Don Farnsworth had great success in selling lots in his new Waverly sub-division.

Finally, after a two-day delay, the lottery or auction of Everglades land by Bolles’ company began on March 13th and concluded on March 24th. Approximately 3,500 contract holders participated and between them they also represented by proxy many of the other 8,500 contract holders resident in many sections of the United States. Contract holders elected three trustees, and in this election 9,320 ballots were cast in person and by proxy. Elected from three different sections of the United States, the trustees’ mandate included receiving the conveyance of 180,000 acres of Florida Fruitlands Company land in trust and the managing of the contract holders’ interests until the latter received a clear title to their Everglades land and a fee simple interest in a twenty-five or fifty foot homesite in the Progresso sub-division which it was expected would evolve into an incorporated city of 10,000 inhabitants in the near future. Just as importantly, the trustees must monitor drainage and reclamation progress until the contract holders could occupy a dry plot of Everglades land, an undertaking which could possibly last for years. Bustling in and out of every conference, answering questions when button-holed and casting oil upon every semblance of troubled waters, Bolles’ top trouble-shooters, J. L. Billingsley and ex-Governor W. S. Jennings, kept a volatile situation fairly well under control.

Before the land lottery actually got underway, contract holders had maps issued to them showing the location of every one of the 12,000 plots which had been purchased. If anyone wished a particular plot favorably located, for example, one contiguous to one of the State canals, he might bid a higher figure than the regular $20 or $24 per acre. The highest bidder obtained the plot, the money paid higher than the $20 or $24 per acre was placed in a special fund, and eventually contract holders would share proportionately in this dividend. These plots were removed from the lottery which followed.

The object of the lottery was to assign Everglades land to every contract holder. And the method employed to do this consisted in the drawing of the name of a contract holder from a container and the simultaneous drawing from another container of a piece of paper with a plot, section and township number. The name drawn now “owned” the land described on the paper drawn. When the State surveyed the land, hopefully within a year or two, the contract holder would get a clear title through the trustees, provided he had made all the monthly payments. Thus, the lottery and future dealings with the Florida Fruitlands Company had to be conducted through the three trustees, who ostensibly worked for the benefit of the contract holders. At least in the beginning the trustees did wring some concessions from the land company, including several additional sections of land to compensate for land removed by lateral canals and ditches. In an interview Jennings gave some revealing statistics about the 180,000 acres of land distributed. Altogether there were 11,972 contract holders divided as follows: ten acre plots, 8,000; twenty acres, 3,600; forty acres, 250; eighty acres, 20; and 640 acres, 2. Of these land purchasers, 2,000 had paid in full for their tracts and none had made less than seven payments.

No doubt the March 1911 land lottery put Fort Lauderdale and the Everglades on the national map. Yet, few of the contract holders remained in either Fort Lauderdale or Dade County for long for they could not as yet occupy or cultivate their Everglades holdings. A small but influential group did, however, remain in Progresso and they built their primitive houses on their twenty-five or fifty foot lots. Secure in their belief the three trustees would satisfactorily handle matters for them, most holders returned home to prepare for the spring planting. But shortly the trustees became embroiled with the land company over details of their contract with it. At the same time some contract holders became disenchanted with the enormous charges the trustees levied against the Florida Fruitlands Company for services rendered, and they carried the former into court in an effort to oust them. Then, early in 1912, Representative Frank Clark of the eastern Florida district publicly charged Bolles and other land speculators with fraud and this led to a congressional investigation. Bad publicity resulted, for over 2,300 United States newspapers ran articles scathingly denouncing all Everglades land speculators and developers. The investigation and the newspaper publicity dealt a stunning set back to the sales of Everglades land and its subsequent drainage and reclamation and made south Florida land in general less sought after. Depreciation of land sales resulted in a sharp slow down in drainage operations by the State, and many contract holders, in despair and disgust of ever farming their holdings, failed to pay their drainage tax and their lands thereby were escheated to the State. In one year alone, over 1,500 plots were escheated, whereby the land purchasers lost all their investment. Bolles, the mastermind of land sales and the lottery, was himself tried several times by federal officials, but each time he was exonerated when state officials, including
the governor, testified in his behalf by declaring that the State and not Bolles controlled the quality and speed of drainage operations. But Bolles and others of his kind had a difficult time overcoming the charge, which obtained national currency, that they sold Everglades land not by the acre but "by the gallon."

Clearly the operations of Richard J. Bolles which led to the land lottery were epochal. Perhaps the Fort Pierce Tribune engaged in considerable exaggeration, but nevertheless it had a kernel of truth in its comment upon the lottery. Opined the Tribune: "The great land drawing at Fort Lauderdale which is taking place this week is undoubtedly the greatest event ever transacted in the State of Florida and columns could be written upon it." The modicum of reality in this statement is that for the first time in history a phalanx of individual farmers had obtained a bona fide title to the richest soil in America and one of Florida's last frontiers had been breached. Following up on the Tribune statement, it might be added that in time some absentee contract holders retained their Everglades land, returned and farmed it, thus making a dent in the wilderness which for almost a century had defied American settlement and cultivation.

A spin-off of Bolles' activity and influence climaxed on March 27th, three days after the completion of the land lottery at Progresso, when more than two-thirds of Fort Lauderdale's electorate gathered in the school building and proceeded to incorporate the Town of Fort Lauderdale under the provisions of a special state statute. Forty-two Lauderdaleans attended the meeting at which J. L. Billingsley, vice-president of the Florida Fertilizer Company, acted as the legal godfather and Edward S. Myers, land agent of the same company, was elected chairman. Citizens nominated William H. Marshall and Joe G. Farrow as mayoral candidates, and when the votes were counted, the former defeated Farrow by receiving thirty votes. Councilmen elected were W. C. Kyle, W. O. Berryhill, E. T. King, W. H. Covington and Tom M. Bryan. Frank A. Bryan received the nod as the new town's clerk. Three days later the councilmen elected King as the president of the town council. In June 1911, the state legislature ratified the incorporation of the Town of Fort Lauderdale.

The newly incorporated town appears to have embraced the one square mile area comprising the "Town of Fort Lauderdale" which Mr. and Mrs. William Brickell had platted in 1895 by the land department of the Florida East Coast Railway Co. For surveying the town section and grubbing out trees and brush from the platted streets and avenues, the railway company received alternate blocks of land from the Brickells.

Consequently, people who originally purchased land in Fort Lauderdale bought it either from the Brickells or else from the Fort Dallas/Model Land Company, the legal holders and developers of the railroad lands.

Little noticed by the public of Dade County at this time, but a matter of some consequence in the creation of Broward County in 1915, was the resignation of County Commissioner Frank R. Oliver of Fort Lauderdale in June 1911, and the appointment and subsequent election of Frank A. Bryan of the same town to replace Oliver as commissioner of the First District. By 1913 Bryan had become chairman of the county commission and a political power in Broward. The first public intimation that the Fort Lauderdale power structure headed by Bryan wanted to create a new county to be named "Everglades County" came on February 21, 1913, when the Fort Lauderdale Herald carried a blistering story to this effect and bragged that Representative George A. Worley of Miami emphatically favored the creation of the new county from Palm Beach and Dade counties.

Agitation for a new county began to crystallize after the Dade County Board of Commissioners on February 7th voted in favor of a referendum by the qualified electorate for a vote on an approximately $400,000 bond issue for the purchase of up to twenty blocks of land located on Miami's Biscayne Bay. This projected land purchase from the Florida East Coast Railway Company would be used in the creation of a deep water harbor in the county seat, but it was hailed by its promoters as a harbor to benefit all the people of Dade County not just Miamians.

The matter of a deep water harbor at Miami had developed, by 1913, into a deeply confused issue with many unpredictable facets which to some also seemed unfathomable. Miami had been unsuccessfully attempting to gain a deep water harbor since 1902, when the federal government spent $100,000 to deepen a 100-foot channel from the ocean to part of the way through Biscayne Bay. At the same time the government signed a contract with the Florida East Coast Railway Company which required the latter to complete the bay channel to the mainland. The railway at that time operated a fleet of ships which needed a deepened harbor channel. Since 1902, however, the railway company had done nothing to complete the channel, and as a consequence, the federal government refused to make further appropriations until the railway company or the city of Miami fulfilled the channel contract. For some reason not made entirely clear to the public, the railway company refused to complete the channel, but it did offer to sell to the City of Miami bayfront property and riparian rights for a deep water harbor for $415,000, provided that the city fulfilled the government contract for the channel. Neither the railway company nor the city had received a firm figure of the cost to complete the channel, but the best estimates hovered around $400,000. Consequently, a bond issue of $400,000 would not insure a deep water harbor for Miami and the thought of an outlay of over $800,000 for a channel and the city blocks necessary for terminals terrified many in the northern part of the county. For all future county insolvence, on the part of many seems justified when the county's total budget for the upcoming year amounted to only $252,000 and the $800,000 figure equaled one-tenth of the value of all the property in Dade County.

Editor-owner William Heine of The Fort Lauderdale Herald minced no words in stating Fort Lauderdale's opposition to Dade County bonding itself for a deep water harbor in Miami, an improvement which would primarily benefit Miami through lower transportation rates, something all of south Florida needed, dependent as it was upon the railroad for transportation. Heine asserted his town's opposition in some mordant language:

Now that the County Capital of Dade has completed all the arrangements to bond the county to purchase wharfage for the ambitious city, the people of the north end of the county have completed their plans to avoid participation in the cost of this luxury by having the legislature set off Everglades County from the northern end of Dade and the southern end of Palm Beach counties, and form the new county of Everglades.

The Fort Lauderdale editor-educator continued by stating it was the purpose of those in favor of division to proceed to bond Everglades County so that funds might be raised to straighten New River and to open and deepen the mouth thereof and thus to facilitate greatly the drainage of a large scope of farm land adjacent to New River.

This will be a much more equitable use of money raised by the scheme of bonding than that of purchas-
Fort Lauderdale, looking west up New River from the Wheeler Building on Brickell Avenue, c. 1910-12 (above), and a North New River Canal scene showing dam erected by the Furst-Clark Company during excavation, c. 1912 (right).

ing city dockage for Miami, that the White City might avail herself of federal appropriations otherwise denied her. The plan to have the whole county, over half a hundred miles square, join in the expense of building up the County Capital is an ambitious scheme and very adroitly laid, and since the population of the county centers about Miami, there is little hope of escaping the net laid except by getting out of the county.

Heine further excoriated Miami by declaring that city bankrupt and a city with a record of "mendacity" in its dealings with the other communities of Dade County. Furthermore, Fort Lauderdale looked forward to success in its undertaking, for Representative Worley had promised to assist in the passage of a bill "that will free us from participation in the expense of Miami's future great prosperity."

Soon the influential Miami Metropolis expressed unqualified support for the division of Dade County, not into two counties, however, but into three, and the newspaper hoped it "may be accomplished with harmony and dispatch." In the March 7th issue, editor-publisher S. Bobo Dean averred there should be a new county centered around Fort Lauderdale, one centered around the Redland district, leaving the central area around Miami as Dade County. In this sentiment, the paper merely echoed Representative Worley. Dean asserted that a new "agricultural empire" was opening up in the reclaimed portion of the Everglades west of Fort Lauderdale and that a series of roads should be built north, south and west of Fort Lauderdale and the whole territory should be improved as a county unit. Dean also saw small as good, for "by centralizing their interest in the smaller district, by boosting for 'Everglades County' with their proverbial enthusiasm, the people of the northern section of the present Dade and the southern section of Palm Beach County would have something well worth working for and all the lower East Coast would be benefitted." Such a county could almost support itself on the fee system common to Florida and this would cover salaries for officials and also improvement expenses. Dean foresaw some difficulties, however, for some people would oppose county division and these would probably be the same people who opposed the creation of Palm Beach County, for they "are proud of the State of Dade," and its romantic history. But, asserted The Miami Metropolis newsman, most everyone agrees the division of four years ago has proved very beneficial to both Dade and Palm Beach counties.

Considered Lilliputians by the Gullivers of Miami, the power structure in miniscule Fort Lauderdale plowed ahead with county division undaunted. On the same day that S. Bobo Dean's editorial appeared in The Miami Metropolis, Colonel George G. Mathews' Fort Lauderdale Sentinel reported a meeting of "a committee," at the office of Mayor William Marshall on March 3rd to discuss dividing Dade County. Those present elected sixty-three year old W. P. Brobeck, a highly respected citizen employed in the haberdashery department of the Oliver Brothers General Store, chairman, and thirty-six year old William Heine, lawyer, educator and editor, secretary. Present besides Brobeck and Heine were these driving entrepreneurs, who represented a mixture of youth and experience: Thomas M. Bryan, Frank R. Oliver, William H. Marshall, E. C. Parker, George G. Mathews, Frank A. Bryan and Edwin T. King. These politically ambitious men appointed committees to visit Deerfield, Pompano, Fort Lauderdale, Dania, Hallandale, Ojus and Boca Raton citizens to get them to sign a petition for the division of Dade County. The coterie agreed to hold a mass meeting in Fort Lauderdale on March 15th for the people in the proposed new county to hear the "best orators that can be procured," and the group asserted that "with the birth of Everglades County we will take on a new life. Wealth and population will increase so fast until we will excite the wonder of the world [sic]." In succeeding editorials Mathews urged the citizens of the proposed county to strike while the iron was hot. But rather than name the new county Everglades, as had been the unanimous choice so far, Mathews proposed: "Let us name the county Broward in honor of Florida's most distinguished son. It will be a fitting tribute to one who commenced the drainage of the Everglades." Lest complacency set in because the division cause had the overt support of powerful Representative Worley and the tacit backing of Senator Fred M. Hudson of Miami, and legislatures uniformly deferred to the judgment of local legislators on local bills,
Mathews urged that it would take more than talk and the naming of committees: “We must work!”

Simultaneously, Heine of the Fort Lauderdale Herald candidly stated on March 7th that division concerned the matter of “local aspirations.” Areas near Miami should support the Miami harbor bond issue but for areas further away such would be unfair for the harbor would be of little benefit for them. But Heine really touched one of the central issues of division when he editorialized that “It is a serious inconvenience for the Fort Lauderdale citizens but more still for the Everglades people to get to Miami to transact their courthouse business.”

Only one narrow rock road led from the northern section of Dade County to Miami, and cars in 1913 were a scarce commodity among an agricultural society. Wagons and buggies still monopolized transportation. Although only twenty-five miles separated Fort Lauderdale from Miami, a round trip to the courthouse in the latter city even on the train consumed the better part of a day. Open air buses or taxis between the two cities remained two years down the pipe.

No one denied that the division of Dade County fell into the big business category. Division would intensify the activities of local government. It would mean a whole new cadre of officeholders who would feed at the local tax trough. A new county would increase the accessibility of courthouse affairs to a whole new range of citizens. As President Woodrow Wilson took office he promised New Freedoms to business and to individuals, and his administration was brought close home to Dade Countians as the president appointed the county’s most famous citizen to the office of secretary of state. The new secretary, William Jennings Bryan, had endeared himself to every section of the county by his own purchase of Everglades land and by his tireless promotion of the ‘Glades as the bread basket of the United States. An air of expectancy gripped Dade County as the year 1913 wore on.

Were the citizens of Dade County primed for the accomplishment of big things? The answer appears that they were, particularly in light of recent south Florida events. The Florida East Coast Railway Company in 1912 had accomplished an engineering feat at one time thought impossible when it completed an overseas railway to Key West. Carl G. Fisher and John S. Collins had begun to develop a mangrove swamp which soon became famous as Miami Beach. In addition a number of communities sprung up adjacent to Miami and the latter city began to incorporate them and thus it greatly expanded its borders. Simultaneously, Miami and Fort Lauderdale and the nascent community of Davie split the economic affairs of the largest financial and land developing company, with the exception of the railroad, in Dade County. For three large Everglades land companies merged into one during the division fight. Capitalized at $1,000,000 and controlling more than 75,000 acres of choice ‘Glades land mostly located near Davie, the consolidated company’s salesmen operated primarily from Fort Lauderdale, but the new company monopolized the banking system of Miami. The merger of the Everglades Sugar and Land Company, the Everglades Land and Sales Company and the Everglades Land Company into the Everglades Land and Sugar Company brought new operating efficiency into a hitherto chaotic muddle.

In the tri-company consolidation, R. P. Davie of Los Angeles, president of the first named company; A. J. Bendle, president of the latter company; and Victor M. Helm of Chicago, formerly president of the second named company, all retained their connection with the Everglades Land and Sugar Company: Davie and Bendle as directors and Helm as the chief executive officer. To increase sales and settlement of their Everglades land, Helm announced plans to build dikes around all the company’s land and to install an elaborate system of huge pumps which would prevent the lands from being overflowed by water from the adjoining tracts, and to effectively drain the new company’s land during the wet season. With the sales of land expected to rise sharply through these improvements, a courthouse located near the sale of these lands would facilitate the issuance of deeds, the recording of sales and the approval of plats. Thus, the location of a courthouse in Fort Lauderdale had obvious advantages for the Everglades Land and Sugar Company over the Miami courthouse.

As the state legislature prepared to meet in Tallahassee, interest in Fort Lauderdale centered on many happenings besides county division. In a heated political campaign, two divisionists ran for mayor, with Colonel Mathews defeating incumbent William H. Marshall 104 to 84. Sensing the strength of the prohibitionists, hitherto anti-prohibitionist Mathews proclaimed for the elimination of the saloon and for the municipal ownership of utilities. The divisionists, instead of obtaining signatures on petitions for division, pointed to the many improvements underway around Fort Lauderdale and argued that these alone merited the creation of Everglades County. Within the past year 135 new dwellings had been constructed within the vicinity of the town and Fort Lauderdale had become the entrepôt for the whole Okeechobee country with the opening of the North New River Canal in 1912. So long term growth seemed inevitable. With Frank A. Bryan as chairman of the Board of County Commissioners a new era in road construction seemed in the offing, particularly since commissioners had promised to assist Frank Stranahan in extending the beach road to New River Sound, and maybe in the near future the commissioners might assist in building a bridge to extend the boulevard all the way to Las Olas beach. In addition, the high railroad tariffs might be skirted through the enlargement of the East Coast Canal from Jacksonville to Miami, an improvement which would permit large-scale canal shipments. This canal improvement had been assured by the award of a dredging contract to the Ben Johnson Dredging Company by the Florida East Coast Canal and Transportation Company, owners of the canal. Finally, the Furst-Clark Construction Company, which had the prime contract to complete the system of canals thought necessary to provide adequate drainage and reclamation avenues for making the Everglades entirely habitable and arable, announced it would complete its work on June 30, 1913, the scheduled completion date.

Possibly, the lack of overt opposition from Miami interests lulled Fort Lauderdale divisionists into thinking they could obtain a new county without much effort. Consequently, the Fort Lauderdale lobbying delegation, composed of Mayor Mathews, Reed A. Bryan and Matthew A. “Mack” Marshall of Dania, arrived in Tallahassee the first week in May and found no organized opposition. The delegation would have pushed for the name of the new county to be Broward instead of Everglades except that another county in north Florida had already voted for division and it had already selected Broward as the name of its new county. Although when this pressure delegation arrived in the capital they found no opposition from Miami interests larger than their hand, such could not be said for Palm Beach County, for Representative H. E. Bussey adamantly opposed slicing Deerfield and Pompano from the southern end of his county to be added to the northern section of Dade to form Everglades County. Then, the divisionists’ ace-in-the-hole began to waver, for Represen-
Captain James Franklin Jaudon, Dade County tax assessor and opponent of the creation of Broward County.

But others asserted there were no more than 300 votes in the Fort Lauderdale precinct, that even in that precinct not all favored county division, and certainly not so in Deerfield and Pompano. Mayor J. W. Watson asserted he had visited Fort Lauderdale recently to ascertain the sentiment there on county division and he had found no unanimity for division. On the contrary, some Fort Lauderdaleans defected from division when Mayor Watson promised that if the county bond issue for a deep water harbor at Miami passed, then Miami would assist Fort Lauderdale in getting it a deep water harbor. When put to a vote as to whether the Miami Board of Trade would oppose county division, the vote was twenty-six to two in favor of opposition. Fortuitously, banker E. C. Romfh wired Senator Hudson that the Miami Board of Trade, "composed of 480 members, unanimously passed a resolution opposing the division of Dade County."

The divisionist committee in Fort Lauderdale responded to the action of Romfh and company with bitterness and warnings. The people in Miami had treated division as a joke until over 500 voters from the northern end of Dade County had enthusiastically petitioned for county division. Committee members castigated some trade board members as making absurd statements and telling "down right lies." In continuation of their offensive, the divisionists asserted the division petition from Fort Lauderdale contained over 350 signatures, the one from Dania nearly 100, and both Dania and Pompano had sent delegations to Tallahassee, and over thirty telegrams had been sent from Fort Lauderdale to Representative Bussey of Palm Beach County urging division. "Does that look like apathy or division of opinion?" asked the division committee. Miami must wake up to the fact that Fort Lauderdale is growing too rapidly to be treated as a ten year old schoolboy any longer. In a revolutionary vein, the divisionists of New River blurted out: "Miami will soon learn that north-end citizens are about to throw off the yoke of oppression which they have worn too long." Do division opponents say there are only 300 votes in the Fort Lauderdale precinct? "Wait till the votes are counted after the bond election — if it ever comes." Lauderdaleans boasted that the over 700 voters in the north end of the county would gain the inevitable victory. If victory for a new county did not come this year, it would when the legislature met again in 1915, "and we will not leave a stone unturned to defeat the proposed bond issue emanating from Miami to buy her municipal docks," retorted the divisionists.

No one raised a more powerful voice for division than did The Miami Metropolis, not even the Sentinel and Herald in Fort Lauderdale whose editors were both rabid divisionists. In a penetrating editorial on May 9th, Editor S. Bobo Dean put the interests of Miami and Fort Lauderdale in juxtaposition and examined them, finding in the process no conflict of interest when the two communities pursued their own self interest. Miami's greatest interest was in developing its harbor, the development of the tributary country, the bringing in of more factories and commercial enterprises, the expansion of the city in all directions, and the construction of more and more highways in the city's immediate vicinity. Fort Lauderdale interests, however, were in many ways different on account of the town's relation to the Everglades, but the Fort Lauderdale section needed the attention and development that could only come from a centralized government whose main idea should be the "advancement of the great territory that would be comprised in the new county. Is it fair for Miami to stand in the way of this advancement?" queried Dean. Dean flayed the Miami Board of Trade for requesting reporters at the hastily called board meeting not to report the meeting for fear it would arouse the ire of Fort Lauderdaleans. The editor saw through the hypocrisy of some board members who claimed that the new county would now take "the cream of the Everglades" when only a short time previously the same people "asserted that these same Everglades were not worth a continental." There can be little doubt that the fervid support of Dean and his paper helped to keep Representative Worley on the firing line for division and prevented Senator Hudson from paying too much attention to the shrill protests emanating from such board members as C. D. Leffler, E. C. Romfh, John Frohock, John Seybold, Judge A. E. Heyser, E. B. Douglas, J. E. Lumnus, Brossier & Son, the Tatum Brothers and Frank B. Shutts, the latter destined within a generation to make the Miami Herald Miami's dominant newspaper, all men whose influence Miami felt for two generations.

The wire service from Tallahassee on May 15th reported that "Enthusiasm for County Division Dampered," despite the fact that W.O. Berryhill had joined the Fort Lauderdale delegation in Tallahassee and the Dania and Pompano delegations had arrived to
add their weight to county division. Enthusiastic when they had first arrived in the capital, now the delegation members were rather discouraged as they left for home on May 15th. Although Representative Worley had passed without opposition the bill to create a new county, a drastic change in the bill had reduced the new county to an area in north Dade County but had excluded Deerfield and Pompano and had left them in Palm Beach County. The name of the new county had been changed from Everglades to Broward when the previously introduced bill for Broward County in northern Florida was defeated. Even this bob-tailed county bill had bogged down in the Senate because of the Miami Board of Trade opposition, for Senator Hudson decided to sit on the bill to await further adjustment of views.

Reed A. Bryan, W.O. Barryhill, Mathew A. "Mack" Marshall and Mayor George G. Mathews of Fort Lauderdale; F. R. Smoak from Pompano; and Colonel Robert J. Reed, E. W. J. Parish and Andrew C. Marshall of Dania composed the final delegation members who lobbied for division in Tallahassee. The force of this lobby weakened when close inspection revealed evidence of "double crossing," for petitions for and against division appeared in Tallahassee signed by the same writers on both sides of the division question. This undoubtedly operated to confuse the issue. Further gloom descended upon the divisionists when they considered that this session of the legislature had not been enthusiastic to create new counties. Three bills to create new counties had already failed, two others looked as if they would fail, leaving the feeling in Tallahassee that although the Broward County bill was still alive it had little chance. Representative Worley stood fast on the compromised bill creating a truncated Broward County but Senator Hudson sought the views of Danians and Hallandalians and he stated he would listen to Miamians opposed to county division provided they brought forth substantive arguments but he would turn a deaf ear to opposition primarily based upon economic hardship. After ten days spent lobbying in the state capital for the creation of Broward County, the delegations from the three towns returned home to report to their constituents.

On Monday night, May 12th, while the divisionist lobby was still in Tallahassee, the Miami Board of Trade held an open meeting with many of their own members present, along with deputations from Dania, Hallandale, Fort Lauderdale and Fulford. A full and free discussion took place, after which the board passed resolutions opposing county division. The resolutions alleged that the elimination of any part of Palm Beach County and Hallandale from the new county would make the tax base too small to support a county and that a poorly operated county would damage the entire east coast; that the recently passed $300,000 bond issue for new Dade County roads would be jeopardized; that the proposed new county would take only one-sixth of Dade County's school enrollment, yet the new county would include one-third of Dade's assessed valuation; and finally, there was no necessity for a new county because Fort Lauderdale could get to Miami in twenty-five minutes on the two daily trains, plus there was a fine rock road and a navigable canal to Miami. A number of Miamians, however, favored division, including influential A. A. Boggs and H. G. Ralston, an attorney and a land developer respectively.

Four spokesmen from the proposed new county spoke, and Miamian T. V. Moore claimed he represented Andrew C. Marshall of Dania, who had been sent to Tallahassee to oppose division but who succumbed to the arguments of his brother "Mack" Marshall and fought for division, but who now,

This 1907 professional directory of Miami lists several men who became involved in the struggle over the creation of Broward County six years later.
according to Moore, had had another change of view and now opposed division because Deerfield and Pompano had been eliminated from the new county. William H. Marshall of Fort Lauderdale adopted an ironic posture, avering while Fort Lauderdaleans favored division, they would remain friends of Miami regardless of whether Broward County was or was not created. W. Quince Bryan of Dania admitted that prior to the elimination of Palm Beach County territory for the new county many Danians favored division but that he now had a proposition with the signatures of 107 Danians opposed to division. E. E. Sommers of Hallandale stated that the southern division line of the new county placed the school building, the two churches and the residences of his community in Broward County and all their farmland in Dade County. Consequently, he didn't believe anyone in Hallandale favored division, and Dade County public school superintendent Robert E. Hall supported Sommers. Crusty old Andrew C. Frost of Dania thundered that Fort Lauderdale had "over revolt" that Dania was "sore" at it and that Dania opposed division under any circumstances. In a conciliatory manner, Miami lawyer and civic leader Boggs related that Senator Hudson had written Boggs several times asking for the sentiment of the community, Hudson saying that he wanted to give the people what they wanted. Boggs assured the Dania and Hallandale representatives they had nothing to fear because their protests would be relayed to Senator Hudson.

Coincidental with Senator Hudson's county division dilemma, he worked to get passed a bill which embodied the issue which ostensibly caused Fort Lauderdaleans to seek the creation of a new county in the first place. Without opposition Hudson prevailed upon the Senate to pass a bill which gave the people of Dade County the authority to hold a referendum to vote on a bond issue, the proceeds of which would be used to construct a deep water harbor at Miami's Biscayne Bay. No referendum, however, was ever held to vote on the bond issue up or down. Proponents of the bond issue and, therefore, opponents of county division, feared voters in the northern section of Dade County might defeat it.

The division-pot boiled in Fort Lauderdale itself during the ten day period in early May 1913, when the divisionist lobby, led by Mayor Mathews, buttonholed legislators in Tallahassee. Groups of men could be seen on the town's streets at all hours of the day and late into the night discussing the probable action of the legislature on division. Every telegram received from Tallahassee on the subject passed from hand to hand. When the news arrived that the county's boundary lines must be shortened because of Palm Beach County's opposition, considerable discussion arose, but the large majority thought this smaller county better than nothing, and with the news that the division bill had passed the House on Saturday, May 10th, a feeling of relief swept Fort Lauderdale.

Back home from Tallahassee, mayor/editor George G. Mathews had nothing but praise for state legislators, particularly Democratic Representative George A. Worley, who had come from north Georgia to Miami in 1897, and who used both a small "d" and a capital "D" when he referred to his political ideas and party. Editorialized Mathews: "When we feel that humanity is losing caste, that it is deteriorating, a trip to Tallahassee always restores our faith, and for the moment we believe there is hope ahead." Mathews, himself a lower house legislator of Florida in the 1890s and in 1907, rhapsodized that the 300 pound Worley "... is a magnificent looking man, and is possessed of intellect and justice in proportion to his weight. Always on the right side of every issue, Worley "... believes the people should rule." In speaking to several legislators on the porch of Tallahassee's Leon Hotel, Worley remarked, "... that he would rather have his right arm cut off than to vote for any measure that the people did not want." But, went on Mathews, even Worley's unexcelled eloquence failed to persuade the disgruntled Danians that the new county would have an assessed valuation of $2,000,000, a tax base sufficient to support Broward County, adding the fact that office holders would be paid on the fee system and thus reduce the need for taxes. Worley's assurances to Danians on the tax score, instead of assuaging Danian fears, only seemed to confirm them in the suspicion that ambitious Fort Lauderdale would get all the political appointments and thereby dominate the new county.

For a mass meeting held in Dania on May 17th to discuss county division and details concerning the proposed Broward County, almost every automobile in Fort Lauderdale was pressed into service, as was the Everglades Grocery Company's big truck, which was loaded to capacity. Mayor Colson of Dania presided over the stirring meeting and speeches poured from the mouths of Mayor Mathews, Andrew C. Marshall, W. Quince Bryan, Samuel L. Drake and Guy Sherman, some pro, some con, on division. The enthusiastic Fort Lauderdaleans, one hundred strong, displayed friendliness and the Fort Lauderdale band bled forth its best music. While the Danians listened attentively to the speeches and chanted the band, hardly anyone could fail to see they saw no future for themselves in Broward County and that they would like to see the county division bill die in the legislature.

No one had plumped harder and more enthusiastically for Broward County than had Matthew A. "Mack" Marshall, brother of Andrew C. and William H. Marshall, the first from Dania and the second from Fort Lauderdale. "Mack" Marshall owned vast acreage in the "Dania District," itself northwest of Dania but not within the corporate town limits, part of which he farmed and part of which he sublet.

In an interview with a reporter of The Miami Metropolis given after the Dania mass meeting, Marshall expressed himself as feeling that county division was dead. If, however, Dania's opposition could be removed, the House-passed bill would be introduced in the Senate by Senator Hudson, but Marshall believed that even division's strongest supporters doubted that Dania could be budged. Marshall said that Hudson had repeatedly told him that unless Dania's objections were removed he would not support division. Hudson added that the south line for Hallandale must be changed to suit the people there, for the House-passed bill had intolerably put the business district in Dade County and the schoolhouse and churches in Broward County.

Hope for the creation of Broward County oscillated from despair to jubilation, and vice versa, throughout the proposed area of the county, depending upon the particular set of circumstances or rumors, and the latter spread rapidly. On May 30th the circumstances seemed upbeat as Editor Mathews' Sentinel carried the headline "Broward County Seems Assured," the news of which seemed the opposite of Mathews' story the previous week that division seemed dead. In the latest chronicle of events, Mathews' associate of a few months, James Johnson, had been sent to Dania and Hallandale had come to realize, as had the citizens of Fort Lauderdale, the present recommended itself as the most auspicious time for the creation of Broward County. Numerous consultations between the leading men of all sections of the proposed county had resulted in a proposition to be submitted to the citizens of Fort Lauderdale, which if supported by them, would mean Hallandale and Dania would support the House passed bill for the creation of the new county. The agreement pre-
favored the new county. Some unnamed die-hard opponents of division, however, still had the ear of the legislator. Thus, when Senator Hudson passed the Broward County local bill on June 4th, the bill set up two districts in the proposed county and called for a referendum in which the majority of each district would have to approve the creation of the new County of Broward before the county could come into existence. Fort Lauderdale, whose electorate had demonstrated they seemingly favored division because a word of dissent had arisen there, was placed in District One, and Dania and Hallandale, and where dissent had manifested itself, were placed in District Two. Fort Lauderdale seemed pleased with the referendum arrangement since passing the concusive agreement with Dania and Hallandale, and Lauderdaleans felt confident ratification of division amounted to hardly more than a formality. Contrariwise, Senator Hudson flatly turned down the repeated pleas of the Miami Board of Trade to quash the division bill for it “would be hurtful,” asserted Miami merchant Charles D. Leffler. Hudson, on the other hand, asserted that the board’s requests were “merely an opinion unsupported by evidence or argument.”

Although dead less than three years, the name and memory of former governor Napoleon B. Broward evoked almost worshipful comments from devotees of the Florida Democratic Party and a hardly less respectful attitude among Floridians in general. Consequently, when Governor Park Trammell signed the bill creating Broward County on June 6th, the first major memorial to the already legendary governor became a reality. Upon signing the bill, Governor Trammell presented the gold pen to Representative Worley, thereby recognizing that this Miamian had earned the sobriquet “Father of Broward County,” for all his valiant labors in its behalf. On June 5th the House had concurred in Hudson’s changes in the bill calling for a referendum, and Governor Trammell had received the bill in its final form only a few minutes before affixing his signature. House Speaker Ion Farris and Senate President E. J. Drane likewise had used the gold pen in placing their signatures on the county document. President Drane alluded to the eponymous use of Broward’s name as he signed: “I wish to call the attention of the senate to the fact that I am about to sign the bill creating the new county of Broward. It gives me great pleasure to be able to put his name on the map, for it is already written on the hearts of the people of the state. It is also fitting that I use a gold pen in signing the bill, for his heart was golden, and it is also fitting that the county should be located at the point of his greatest and most enduring work.”

In an editorial of June 20th, The Miami Metropolis gave a clear perspective of the fundamental matters which surrounded the new county of Broward, matters which would, as the event proved, outline the results of the referendum set for July 8th. Editor S. Bobo Dean began by rightly reminding everyone that the future of Broward County lay in the hands of the voters of District Two, namely, those of Dania and Hallandale, for it appeared that the District One voters of Fort Lauderdale almost unanimously supported division, a commendable conviction. Dean went on to assert that the earnest, intelligent men who were leading the division project could see in the making of a new county unit a chance for a development which could not be attained in any other way, and the insinuation of “political trickery” or other underhandedness “... for the winning of the issue are unworthy the thought of any clean-thinking man.” Fort Lauderdaleans, more than any other people, realized the future value of Everglades reclamation and settlement. Still seeing Broward County’s future prosperity and greatness tied to the Everglades, Dean stated that the people of Fort Lauderdale had repeatedly seen the wonderful harvests from the ‘Glades land then under cultivation and they were confident that the day was near at hand when the territory of Broward County would be one of the
greatest farming regions in the world, with Fort Lauderdale as "the Gateway to the Everglades." Furthermore, the people of the new county "are energetic, ambitious and progressive, admirable traits, and they feel they can make the greatest progress by having the reins of county government in their own hands." But whichever way the referendum went, The Miami Metropolis believed the people of northern Dade could be trusted to act wisely, for they were intelligent and could settle matters rightly.

The referendum provision of the Broward County Act immediately drew the sharp scrutiny of Miami lawyers, some of whom gave out opinions to the effect that the legislative act which created the new county was unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality of the act lay in its delegation to the governor the power to determine where the provisions of the fundamental law of Florida reserved this right to the legislature. Predictions flew around that a test case might be made by those opposed to county division. But those who favored division alleged that other counties of Florida had been created by a similar process. Opponents retorted that even if such was the case the constitutionality of the referendum still remained to be tested in the courts. Some legal experts took a different tactic by asserting that the Supreme Court of Florida might rule the referendum section unconstitutional but would leave the balance intact. This latter position raised the interesting possibility that Broward County was already a reality and had been ever since the governor signed the division bill on June 6th. As if the foregoing did not create enough uncertainty as to the status of the new county, the July 8th referendum itself increased the possibility of total confusion. If, of course, a majority in each of the two districts favored the new county, then there would be no need for a decision by the Supreme Court. The confused state of things received an unexpected impetus from a man in authority. County Attorney L.R. Ray asserted that the legislative act was unconstitutional because of illegal deputation of legislative power to the people, but he also believed Broward County to be a present reality because only that portion of the legislative act was illegal which referred to a referendum.

Voters defeated the creation of Broward County on July 8th, when District Two, composed of Dania and Hallandale, cast ballots against county division, the former community by a vote of fifty-four to sixteen and the latter by twenty-nine to ten margin. District One, comprising Fort Lauderdale, by an almost unanimous vote of 208 to 3, approved the new county. Thus, it had been left to the minority of voters in the proposed county, division would have carried overwhelmingly by a vote of 234 to 86. The campaign had been hard fought on both sides since the governor signed the Broward County bill into law, a fact reflected by the great excitement at Dania which caused a phalanx of deputy sheriffs to be stationed at the polls for fear of violence.

The excitement hatched from the fact that eighty citizens, mostly from Davie or Zona, had been registered by the supervisor of registration after the governor had signed the division bill and it was well known that most of them favored division. Alleging that the registration supervisor had illegally opened his books, opponents of division obtained an injunction and carried the case to the federal court in Jacksonville where it was dismissed shortly before the referendum. Those in Hallandale and Dania who brought the suit to destroy the allegedly illegal registration books constituted some of these communities' most upright and prominent citizens. Included from Hallandale were W. A. McRae, L.H.O. Sjostrom, H. T. Geiger and Charles Ericson, and from Dania objects included John W. Mulliken, Martin C. Frost, S. M. Alsobrook, E. M. Nelson, H. T. Tubbs and James M. Holding. Although the suit to prevent recent voter enrollees from voting failed in the federal court, nevertheless, Dania election inspectors John W. Mulliken, F. G. Taylor and P.H. Roper refused to allow fifty-five Zonians to cast their ballot, ostensibly in favor of division. Incensed Fort Lauderdaleians declared the referendum invalid on several scores and threatened to take the matter to the Florida Supreme Court for adjudication.

In a post election editorial Mayor Mathews of the Sentinel sought to define the role of a majority in a democracy, in discussing the just concluded referendum in the light of what he called "... the cardinal principal of this government" which is based upon the rule of the majority. The Broward County Act was, as far as Mathews saw it, only one ever passed where the majority secured a place above the majority. Thus, the Broward County Act might be illegal. Mathews cited the fact that in the case of the recent creation of Pinellas County, its acceptance depended upon a favorable majority in a referendum. But the citizens of the entire county voted without the use of districts. Had Senator Hudson given the divisionists the chance they would have won by a majority of 145, but as it was, Hallandale and Dania with only a fifty-seven majority was more powerful than Fort Lauderdale with over a 200 vote majority. Mathews did not question Senator Hudson's right to refuse to pass the bill if the majority of the people of Dania and Hallandale objected to a new county. But when Hudson passed the bill creating Broward County and gave the minority the right to rule the majority, this was contrary to the fundamental principle which in our government gives the majority the right and power to rule. Certainly, Mathews continued, the referendum provision as framed by Senator Hudson "seems absurd and cannot be upheld by the State constitution."

An article which appeared in The Miami Metropolis shortly before the July 8th referendum and entitled "Are Voters Registered in Broward Qualified?" raised some questions which puzzled many of the best minds in south Florida, including the legal mind. Asked the Metropolis: "If the approximately one hundred citizens permitted by County Registrar A. L. LaSalle to register in northern Dade County between June 14th and the 17th are legally registered, will they be qualified to vote in the wet and dry election expected this fall?" Most of the registrants were believed to be in favor of division. Eventually, County Attorney Railey ruled the newly registered were not eligible to vote in the wet and dry referendum. After Railey's ruling following the July 8th referendum, LaSalle felt he owed the people of Dade County an explanation of his actions. LaSalle asserted he permitted citizens in northern Dade to register for three days because he thought the division referendum was a local election solely for county division. On July 25th, consonant with Railey's ruling, LaSalle erased the names of the newly registered voters, thereby assuring that these northern county citizens would be barred from voting in the forthcoming wet and dry referendum, a move some thought could have serious repercussions for alcoholic inhibition and division matters.

In a county where some of Dade County affairs at this time appears no where more striking than in the county's assessed property valuation and public expenditures for 1913-14. Tax Assessor J. F. Jaudon announced in the summer of 1913 that the total property valuation for the county for the next fiscal year would amount to $7,900,000, $5,000,000 of which represented Miami's assessment. At the millage rate of 40.5, the same as the previous year, Dade County would raise in the forth-
coming year a total of $237,000 in taxes. In contrast, Fort Lauderdale, next to Miami in importance in the county, voted its first bond issue on September 9th, a paltry $16,000, which included nothing for road construction. Meanwhile, for years Miami had been constructing unpaved rock roads which made it the envy of all Florida. That Fort Lauderdale needed to replace its sand streets with rock roads seems obvious in light of the town’s miserly expenditure of only $2,800 for roads in its two and one-half years of corporate existence. Even the bond issue did not escape the scalpel of the sumptuary-minded Lauderdaleians who pared the $20,000 bond issue to $16,000, eliminating in the process $4,000 for the extension of the water and sewage facilities.

In opposing the $400,000 bond issue to build a deep water harbor at Miami, an enormous indebtedness which all the citizens of Dade County would have to pay, leading Lauderdaleians had early expressed their intention to build just such a harbor for world trade near the New River Inlet. On September 4th, these Lauderdaleians began to take the first steps in making good their intention as they gathered in Oliver Hall. They heard Mayor Mathews assert the move to assure a deep-water harbor was the most important undertaking ever made in Fort Lauderdale. The Town, however, needed the support of the surrounding area, particularly that of the owners of Everglades land. A harbor, Mathews continued, would break the tyranny and high rates of the Florida East Coast Railway Company, and simultaneously and immediately it would add 200 per cent to the value of all property south of Lake Okeechobee. Following Mathews’ hip-hooray remarks, a general discussion ensued. One of the overly optimistic predictions to float to the surface among the discussants was that within ten years after the completion of the harbor Fort Lauderdale would reach the 50,000 mark in population.

To solidify sentiment and to push forward plans for a deep-water harbor, Mayor Mathews appointed a Promotion Committee which those present made permanent. Prominent Fort Lauderdale merchants, lawyers and newspaper men made up the membership of the committee whose task involved the developing of plans for a harbor as well as the creation of a public sentiment favorable to the successful completion of the harbor. Evidence that the harbor plan had long been in the works was provided when Dade County Engineer Hobart Crabtree presented at the meeting a detailed report and blueprint for an adequate harbor. Crabtree’s plans called for a twelve foot deep channel at New River Inlet, a 1,000 by 1,500 foot turning basin and jetties, all of which would require the removal of 555,000 cubic yards of materials, an undertaking which would cost $200,450. As the federal government was expected to spend its harbor money at Miami, only twenty-six miles distance, Crabtree said that Fort Lauderdale should not expect financial help from the government but there should be no difficulty in Lauderdaleians securing a government permit to modify New River Inlet. With enthusiasm running high, in October 1913, the participants in the September meeting organized the “Deep Water Harbor Company, Inc.” with William H. Marshall as president and with a capitalization of $500,000. Apparently, the organization of the harbor company did not mean the dissolution of the permanent Promotion Committee whose membership consisted of Frank R. Oliver, Frank Stranahan, Guy Sherman, William Heine and H. G. Wheeler.

As had been long dreaded by the wets but just as eagerly anticipated by the prohibitionists, early in September 1913, the Dade County dry advocates presented to the Board of County Commissioners a petition for a referendum to make the county dry. Defensive wet forces challenged the right to vote on many of the petitioners and for one reason or another the number of petitioners slipped from 996 to 900, but still sixty-three more signers than the twenty-five underqualified of qualified voters needed to force the referendum. For only 836 signatures from the qualified voter list of 3,344 was needed to force the showdown between the wets and drys. Even with this reduction on the petition, the wets still claimed that at least 100 additional signatures were invalid and they obtained a temporary injunction, then went into the federal court at Jacksonville in an attempt to make the injunction against the referendum permanent. But Federal Judge Simmons denied their claim for he ruled the wets had presented no evidence of forgery and he ordered the referendum to be held on October 30th, as scheduled.

With Senator Fred M. Hudson heading the Dade County Anti-Saloon League as president, reinforced by many other prominent Miamians, and supported above all by The Miami Metropolis published by S. Bobo Dean, the drys waged a dignified but vigorous campaign for prohibition of alcoholic beverages, for this unnecessary drink corrupted private and public life. In several trenchant sentences in one hard-hitting editorial, Dean summed up opposition to the saloon by asserting: “The OPEN SALOON HAS NO EXCUSE FOR EXISTENCE. IT REAPS A HARVEST OF MANHOOD AND GIVES NOTHING IN RETURN; it is a curse in every community in which it is allowed to run; it causes more suffering, more heartache and more misery, than all other agencies combined. FROM BOTH A BUSINESS AND A MORAL STAND POINT IT SHOULD BE ABOLISHED.”

Not having a newspaper as a vehicle to express their side of the matter, the wets relied upon placards and word of mouth communication to sway the populace. Their two main arguments stressed the right of individual freedom and that to maintain and to enhance the developing tourist trade, saloons were needed. In the advancement of the latter argument for saloons, wet advocates asserted that many well-to-do people coming south expected to find hostleries in Miami which dispensed “refreshments.” In rebuttal of this argument, however, The Miami Metropolis declared that:

In Miami any argument that the saloon is needed for the tourist business, is an insult to both the tourist and the home people. Tourists of the class that are a benefit to any town do not demand the saloon, while the type of settler attracted to this section should unquestionably be the man who is looking for a place to live in the best environment and to rear his children under the moral influence. Miami is building for the future.

As if the combined weight of people of prominence and the most influential local newspaper tipping the scales heavily against them were not handicap enough, the wets further suffered from a new law which went into effect October 1st. For on that date a state law mandated the removal of screen obstructions to licensed drinking places and it was now possible for street and sidewalk passersby to have a clear and unimpeded view of the inside of saloons and particularly that part immediately outside the bar, rail or counter.

Although Lauderdaleians had amongst themselves many quality elbow-benders, in the fall of 1913 the dry forces had things fairly well in hand and Lauderdaleians prone to visit the saloon found none in Fort Lauderdale. But some wets, among them Mayor Mathews, who later candidly testified he imbibed in 1913, drank in their homes and so did not defend with
much vigor the "open saloon" where a man could easily make a fool of himself to his neighbors and family. As the date for the referendum approached, the firmly convinced of the drays argued their case with ever increasing fervor in an effort to secure the largest possible majority for the elimination of alcoholic use in Fort Lauderdale and, indeed, in Dade County. Mayor Mathews and his cohorts, still ranking from the county division defeat and the deep water harbor proposal for Miami, saw the referendum as an opportunity to humiliate proud Miami.

Crowed Mathews on October 17th, two weeks before the referendum: "This is one time that Miami is looking with fear on the power of Fort Lauderdale. They claim down there that this place will decide the wet or dry election. Then they are fearful that we will get a deep water harbor before they do." Known as a man who did not scruple when it came to the consumption of hard liquor, Mathews publicly revealed his new-found anti-saloonism and declared: "For the benefit of a few who assert that I am wet, I will say that on the 30th of this month I will vote dry as sure as I live to get to the voting place." Vermen emotional appeals exemplified by an article which appeared in Mathews' Sentinel titled "How Are You Voting My Brother, Wet Or Dry?" sought to publicically castigate wets who would "... license the liquor traffic that ruins body and soul." Fundamental to all dry endeavors stood the Women's Christian Temperance Union, a largely Protestant organization by which the women flexed their moral muscle. The W.C.T.U., as it was universally known, aroused men, women and children to fight "demon rum." In Fort Lauderdale, as elsewhere, as the fray heated up, the W.C.T.U. sponsored a dramatic street demonstration in which singing children adorned with banners and horns paraded through the streets of the town and together with the women listened to a fiery dry speaker at the Dade Theatre. In the evening before election day the men of Fort Lauderdale received the same dose of anti-rumist at the theatre located on Wall Street.

Heavy rains driven by high winds on referendum day prevented many from getting to the polls. In Fort Lauderdale the polls closed early at 4:41 p.m., and the poll inspectors counted the ballots and immediately wired the results to the courthouse in Miami, but most other county precincts reported more slowly. Unsurprisingly to most political observers, Fort Lauderdale went heavily dry by a 138 to 31 margin; Dania and Hallandale followed with dry margins of 51 to 40 and 23 to 9 respectively, or a dry majority from northern Dade County of 130. Miami, on the other hand, voted wet by a margin of 453 to 264, or a wet majority of 189. When the votes from all the county's twenty precincts were counted, however, drys won by a vote of 978 to 863, a 115 dry majority. Now for the first time since its settlement in the 1830s, Dade County had officially gone into the dry, rather than the anti-saloon, column. Up to 1895 the county was dry since there were no towns and no places for saloons. In 1895, however, a referendum was held and the county voted wet. Several times since 1895, referendums had been held and each time the wets won, but sometimes by small margins. Only six years previously, in 1907, the wets had won by the exceedingly small margin of six votes, so that the October 30th referendum result had been anticipated in many quarters.

In an editorial Mayor Mathews played the referendum result to the hilt. With some justification, he asserted that in the wet vs. dry contest Fort Lauderdale played the decisive role. The town would continue to have great influence in future county elections "... if we remain a part of the county." When the registration books again opened, he continued, "... we will have fully 500 votes. With that vote if we handle it right we can hold the balance of power." Although Dade Countians must now go to Palm Beach County to purchase liquor, faithful women would monitor their imbibition pecadilloes or worse lapses. Or as one wag put it:

The county is not wet,
And some people fret,
And are almost ready to cry;
But the women, you bet,
Are on their jobs yet,
And will keep Old Dade dry.

Dominant in Dade County for a generation and bolstered by an electorate almost equal in number to that of the drys, almost immediately after the referendum the wets counter-attacked, determined to win back the saloon, but to win it back on an issue different from the wet vs. dry controversy. The wets instead would "recreate" Broward County and in doing so would make Dade County wet again, for the dry majority derived from the northern section of Dade County would be voided and Dade would again be wet by a majority of fifteen votes. Said to be mostly from the northern section of Dade County, on November 4th, ten men including James P. Paulsen of Dania, protested the referendum result and asked the Board of County Commissioners to canvass the votes from Fort Lauderdale, Dania and Hallandale, as the petitioners stated they believed these three precincts constituted Broward County. Consequently, the electors there had no right to vote in a Dade County referendum. The county commissioners under the chairmanship of Frank A. Bryan of Fort Lauderdale disregarded the petition. Whereupon the petitioners appealed to Federal Judge Simmons in Jacksonville and

![The Dade County Courthouse, Miami, as it appeared in the 1900s and 1910s.](image)
asked him to restrain Dade County Sheriff Dan Hardie from closing the saloons in Dade County. But Judge Simmons declined to issue the requested injunction and Hardie closed the saloons in conformity with the vote of the people that liquor, beer, wine, etc., should not be sold in Dade County.

A more serious move to create Broward County and at the same time save the saloons in Dade County came from the wets of Miami who belatedly posed as Broward County supporters. Engaging the high-powered legal firm of Atkinson, Gramling and Burdine, the wets through their attorneys applied to the Florida State Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus declaring the County of Broward created. R. Freeman Burdine, member of the legal firm, sought the writ on the double ground that the minority ruled in the county division referendum and that Fort Lauderdale, comprising the majority of voters in the proposed new county, had solidly voted for division. In seeking the writ, wets sought to have Broward County declared a county as of the date of the July division referendum, in which case the votes of the three precincts of northern Dade County in the recent wet/dry referendum would be thrown out, and by a majority of seventeen votes [sic.] Dade County would remain a wet county. Much to the consternation of the wets, the State Supreme Court refused to issue the writ, one many observers thought was based on legal fiction.

Drys, meantime, rejoiced in the casting out of the saloon and its attendant evils in Dade County. Senator Fred M. Hudson of the Anti-Saloon League talked enthusiastically about Miami's future, declaring that "... Miami dry looks ten times better than Miami wet," and that the "drying" up of Miami was one of the best things which had ever befallen the Magic City. As one of the authors of the Broward County bill which passed the legislature, Hudson asserted that he could not see upon what grounds the wets could construe that document as to make Broward County already a fact. "The bill can only mean what it says," said the senator, "and by its plain provisions the voters declared against the establishment of the county." In commenting upon Hudson's statement that Miami in the recent referendum had made the best move she had ever taken, Editor Mathews in the Sentinel corrected the legislator by declaring: "Well, we wish to say that Miami never took the step willingly, that the improved condition is a present that Fort Lauderdale gave her, as Miami gave a large majority against the town going dry and many of them seem to believe that Miami will never get over the evil inflicted upon them by the changes. We know," continued the Fort Lauderdale mayor, "that Miami is not very grateful for the favor we have done her, nevertheless, feeling that we have done our duty, we are more than compensated for voting Dade County dry." Mathews, diplomatically, did not point out that Fort Lauderdaleans could easier travel to wet Palm Beach County for liquid refreshments than could Miamians and consequently wet Lauderdaleans did not shoulder as heavy a handicap as did their counterparts in Miami.
The wets in Miami, although rebuffed by the Supreme Court, nevertheless refused to leave the field of battle quietly. Through their legal counsel they attempted to secure a temporary injunction in the local circuit court presided over by Judge J. Emmet Wolfe which would restrain officers of the city from molesting barkeepers while they re-opened their saloons. In ruling against the saloon owners, Judge Wolfe held that a temporary injunction would be an improper remedy in a case of this kind, that such a court order could not be granted where its effect would be to change the present status of things. The county was now dry, ruled Wolfe, and it could not be made wet by a temporary injunction. The court held that Dade County could be made wet by the courts only after hearing all the "equities" of the case laid down in a bill of equity. But the wets were persistent if nothing else. For it was only after their sixth legal attempt in early December 1913 to make Dade County wet again that the saloon forces gave up the battle for wetness and for the creation of Broward County.

Mayor Mathews applauded Judge Wolfe's decision which disallowed technical points which hitherto, according to Mathews, had caused the people to lose faith in the courts. Mathews thought Miamians weak on prohibition but he saw his own town as their benefactor. He ironically asserted: "Fort Lauderdale will see that Dade County remains dry. We do not believe that whiskey in any form enriches a town, or in any way improves morals." He hung the wets out to dry when he arraigned them in a terse condemnation by declaring that "Whiskey men are the corruptors of politics" and their business "produces more immorality than any other line of business in the world."

In a righteous display of its role as a guardian of public morals, Mathews’ Fort Lauderdale Sentinel would accept no more liquor advertisements while the present contracts expired. No more would Jacksonville liquor firms be able to place ads for prepaid brands such as "Red Rock Rye, absolutely pure rye, guaranteed to be seven years old — $4.00 for 4 quarts," or for "Celery Gin; this article has relieved thousands of kidney and bladder trouble."

With the prohibition movement gaining momentum on all fronts from the local precinct level to the state capital throughout the United States during the second decade of the twentieth century, ever increasingly the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages became involved in politics. Since education and exhortation alone could not stem the use of alcohol, reformers gravitated to the ballot box for a remedy which meant that issues other than alcoholic consumption might well be involved when local options were conducted.

The Miami liquor interests, whether consumer or seller, learned a lesson from the two Dade County referendums conducted in 1913, one for the creation of a new county, the other for the local option to determine the future of legal alcoholic sale and consumption. Because the vote of the northern section of the county could be decisive in the matter of the local option, the wets determined that in the next legislative attempt to form Broward County, which would be in 1915, their interests would best be served by supporting this attempt.

The bitterness of Fort Lauderdaleans toward the Miami Board of Trade for the board's opposition to county division, a bitterness which spilled over into carping over the enormous salaries between the schools of the two communities, taught the board members that they should not oppose any further movement to create Broward County, else business relations between the two towns would further deteriorate. Besides, Miami no longer needed the help of all of Dade County to obtain their deep water harbor, the factor which had originally embittered Fort Lauderdaleans toward Miami.

The matter of the Miami harbor was partially resolved in December 1913, without the intervention of Dade County, when prominent Miami business and professional men headed by attorney Crates D. Bowen, Carl G. Fisher and James S. Collins subscribed enough money to enable the City of Miami to dig the harbor channel across Biscayne Bay irrespective of whether or not the courts held the Florida East Coast Railway Company liable for the channel under its 1902 contract with the federal government.

Concurrently, there was no further necessity for the $415,000 county-wide bond issue to purchase the land and riparian rights for the harbor from the Flagler railroad interests. This bond issue had been approved by the state legislature on May 29th but it had never been submitted to the people for ratification because of the bitter county division and wet/dry referendums. With Miami experiencing a mild boom partially due to the opening of the Miami Canal to Lake Okeechobee, the city's bonding capacity had been raised to $600,000, an amount more than sufficient to purchase the railroad land and riparian rights, but it would be many years before Miami would have a deep water harbor, and even longer for Fort Lauderdale.

Fort Lauderdaleans learned at least two lessons from the successive referendums and the political/economic struggles which ensued. The New River town became conscious of its political clout vis-a-vis Miami. No longer would Fort Lauderdaleans think of themselves as economic satellites of the Miami City, even though the latter in size and resources towered like a Colossus over the river town. The riverine inhabitants in the late struggles had developed a yen for political and economic independence from the Biscayne Bay city. As for political matters in northern Dade County, the Fort Lauderdale power structure had demonstrated in the referendums that it could muster an overwhelming majority in matters which affected its relations with Dania and Hallandale. Consequently, when the next legislature would consider the creation of Broward County, Fort Lauderdale would not have to make innumerable political concessions to these two communities in order to carry the day for the creation of a county which Fort Lauderdale aspired to dominate.

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