Critical Concepts

Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘Habitus’ and the Political Economy of the Media

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Few scholars have been cited in scholarly work as much as Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Bourdieu’s ideas have left a vigorous legacy in sociology and in anthropology, and have received ongoing, if more fitful, attention in fields as far flung as English, art, and communication. Famously described as a theorist who was “good to think with”, Bourdieu’s ideas occasionally suffer for not lending themselves very directly to specific scholarly approaches. Many of his major ideas are so sweeping and all-inclusive as to become difficult to implement in a program of research. For those who, like me, argue in favor of adopting Bourdieu’s ideas for the study of communication, it is important to address how his ideas can be applied to particular problems in the field. This is what I attempt to do here: to connect one of Bourdieu’s most widely-adopted ideas—that of habitus—with contemporary developments in the political economy of the media, with an emphasis on how habitus can help us to conceptualize much of what remains largely missing from political economy, without leading us down the road of mere scholasticism.

I argue that the concept of habitus, when applied to questions of political economy of communication, points to a significant lacuna in much extant research concerning political economy. Political economy of communication has focused largely on the structures and institutions that are thought to dominate the system of mediated communication. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that this focus on institutions has been the definitive central tendency in political economic work in communication. The incorporation of habitus into the theoretical mechanism of political economy will give us a sense of exactly how structural arrangements come to matter. After all, the Marxist quarry in this game should not be the names of the corporations that have consolidated, or a catalog of their joint ventures and synergistic designs. If political economists are to understand processes of domination, the place to look would be at the practices made possible (and those made less possible) by these structural arrangements, as embodied by the producers and audience members themselves. Habitus could be the proper starting place for a reinvigorated political economy of communication. Its focus on the everyday, seemingly minor, and taken-for-granted aspects of life—on the micro-level—is what we should be
casting onto the screen of structural arrangements. We already have a solid sense of how macro-level details in the structure of the media matter to micro-level experiences. Habitus allows us to close this hermeneutic circle: micro is the new macro.

**Habitus: The Concept Itself**

Habitus is probably the best starting place for understanding Bourdieu’s ideas. Adapted for various uses in some of his best-known and relatively obscure work, the concept of habitus has demonstrated itself to have a flexibility that threatens to undermine its conceptual utility. Bourdieu developed the concept of habitus in an effort to get beyond the so-called structure/agency divide in the social sciences. This divide finds a particularly vigorous manifestation in communication, with its ongoing debates between scholars of media production and scholars of media reception. There is reason to believe that use of the concept of habitus will allow political economists to develop a better set of answers to the more cogent critiques from the culturist camp in media studies.

What is habitus? It would be wrong to state that the word has one simple definition. In Bourdieu’s own work, one finds habitus to be an evolving concept, taking form in a dialectic with his diverse research interests. Michael Grenfell helpfully traces the use of the term back to Bourdieu’s early research concerning the lives of Béarn farmers, to his work in *Les Héritiers*, and in *La Reproduction*, where the concept of habitus “is used to express durable dispositions of individuals which guide social practice”. In *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Bourdieu explains habitus as a rejection of theories that “explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a mechanical reaction, directly determined by the antecedent conditions and entirely reducible to the mechanical functioning of pre-established assemblies,” while also rejecting the idea that “we should bestow on some creative free will the free and willful power to constitute, on the instant, the meaning of the situation by projecting the ends aiming at its transformation.” Bourdieu was very much concerned with overcoming a number of binary divisions in the social sciences, and habitus represents his attempt to incorporate both sides of the structure/agency debate.

Turning now to brass-tacks definitions, Bourdieu explains that habitus

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\text{is the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations [which] produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.}\]

Though it is frustrating that Bourdieu here defines habitus in part by using the word ‘habitus’ again, this is a starting point for the concept. We see here quite clearly how habitus is suggested as something closely linked to reproduction. The emphasis on reproduction is a little (not much) more clear in Bourdieu’s later description of habitus as
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

This conception of habitus represents what Bourdieu has described as an attempt to get past, amongst other things, the opposition between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of practice; he saw these “two moments” standing “in a dialectical relationship.”

Habitus represents an attempt to draw attention to the relational component of everything social, without unmooring praxis from context. The concept of habitus, David Swartz argues,

offers a programmatic research agenda for addressing the agency/structure issue and points to an ideal-typical pattern of action. The research agenda derives from his theory that action is generated by the encounter between opportunities or constraints presented by situations and the durable dispositions that reflect the socialization of past experiences, traditions, and habits that individuals bring to situations.

This helpfully makes habitus a concept that can be, in a sense, plugged into all kinds of other research traditions, including political economy.

Admitting that the idea of habitus, though very much relevant, is not particularly comprehensible, for my purposes here I would describe habitus in terms of media processes. Take the production of media content. This content does not come out of the sky, nor does it come directly from an institution. It comes from practices that have emerged from past experience, are simultaneously constrained and enabled by structural arrangements (including legal, technical, and market concerns), and owe their existence to the strategic orientation of those whose labor is directly tied up with making media content. One of the most well-traveled hypotheticals for this would be the situation of the U.S. newspaper reporter, whose practices come not so much from the stated goals of a journalism school or a statement of professional values as from the day-to-day interactions with superiors and subordinates, sources and colleagues. Through this, the reporter (or any other producer of media content) gets a feel for the game: a feel that is embodied (and thus irreducible to simple logical-seeming rules) and a game that is taken seriously, though perhaps rarely understood in terms of the larger structural forces at play.

Seen this way, habitus gives us a way of thinking about media content production as something that owes its shape largely to structural arrangements, but also as something that plays out in praxis, in the everyday world of doing things. And for the political economist of communication, habitus tells us where to look for things like domination, hegemony, and reproduction. Much as Marx and Engels derided
the “German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth,” suggesting instead
that we should “ascend from earth to heaven,” the concept of habitus gives us a
way of getting down to the utterly practical, materialistic aspects of life that repre-
sent the best starting places for an analysis of political economy. In this sense, habi-
tus focuses our attention more squarely on issues that are only hinted at by the term
‘praxis’. Habitus gets us past praxis, demanding that we not only take a materialist
standpoint to understand what people do, but also examine how people conceptual-
ize their own behavior, as a specific variant of the field of possibles, and as this
conceptualization relates to institutional and other power structures.

For Bourdieu, habitus always operates in relation to fields of socially con-
structed position-takings. Here, the “task [for the researcher] is that of constructing
the space of positions and the space of the position-takings in which they are ex-
pressed.” Habitus becomes the means by which the field becomes internalized,
settled within us, with individuals occupying their own roles within the field,
each reflecting differently off of other agents, hence the importance of relational
thinking. Structure here becomes something that is given meaning to the extent that
it is embodied in individuals. For this reason, a habitus-based analysis would exam-
ine structures at work not only on the broad level of institutions and corporations,
but tie this macro-level understanding to the micro-level of praxis. Power is directly
implicated in this model as, “by obeying the logic of the objective competition be-
tween mutually exclusive positions within the field, the various categories of pro-
ducers tend to supply products adjusted to the expectations of the various positions
in the field of power, but without any conscious striving for such adjustment.” On
the face of it, Bourdieu gives us with habitus a model for social reproduction and
domination, a model that incorporates the focus on praxis that Marx’s base-
superstructure account leads to, while broadening the scope of analysis beyond eco-
nomics. It would be difficult to find a social theory that more fully addresses what
Marx meant when he stated that people do not make history “as they please,” but
only “under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the
past.” Habitus represents Bourdieu’s attempt to get at the directness of this en-
counter of structurally-embedded social practice.

Habitus can be linked up quite directly to institutions. Indeed, it is through habi-
tus that institutions reproduce the practices required for the social reproduction nec-
 essary for social sustenance. As Beate Krais puts it, “[i]t is by habitus that the
meaning objectified in institutions is reactivated, that institutions are kept alive,
but only by imposing the revisions and transformations that are counterpart and
conditions of the reactivation.” In this sense, it is through habitus that institutions
reproduce themselves (or reproduce the dispositions that make them possible), and
it is through habitus that individuals develop the means through which to accom-
modate themselves to institutional needs/functions.

The field of communication has, speaking broadly, done very little with the
concept of habitus, or with other Bourdieu-ian ideas. There are also cases where
communication scholars have argued that Bourdieu’s ideas can do little for political
economy. No lesser political economist than Nicholas Garnham has expressed
grate doubts regarding the importation of Bourdieu’s theoretical model to the
realm of critical media research. Garnham’s critique is sweeping. He finds
Bourdieu to be too indebted to culturist explanations, and too much of a determinist. In Bourdieu’s schema, Garnham finds “no room for the possibility of social experience producing radically critical alternative world views and political programs with a real purchase on the process of social change.” Whereas the “Marxist theory of knowledge…requires both the recognition of a real world and the possibility of its cognition in terms of a nonarbitrary and at least potentially universal classificatory schema within which a common set of truth claims can be accepted and values agreed upon,” Bourdieu’s habitus gives us what Garnham describes as an all-too-hermetically sealed social reality, a Durkheimian perpetual motion machine, all functionalism and no change. Other Bourdieu scholars paint a similar portrait of his ideas. David Swartz’s essential (and largely approving) review of Bourdieu’s work casts him, I think, in a relatively Durkheimian light.

Speaking very broadly, there has been a pattern by which Bourdieu has been placed on one side of the debate (played out, mutatis mutandis, across the social sciences) between those who ask ‘what makes society possible?’, and those (associated with the word ‘critical’) who inquire into power imbalances in society, and how to address them. From the point of view of communication scholarship, treating Bourdieu as a neo-Durkheimian with touches of Weber (as many do) blocks him off from critical scholarship. This should not be sufficient for communication. We are all familiar with James W. Carey’s ritual interpretation of reading the newspaper, which takes reading the newspaper “less as sending or gaining information and more as attending a mass, a situation in which nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed.” If habitus were only applicable to studies of this kind of reassertion of social order along the ritual dimension—which Carey himself did not propose—there would be good reason to presume that it could do little for more critical understandings of communication. Though one of the strengths of habitus is that it does help to explain the consent of the dominated, it also gives us something more than just another tool for understanding how views of the world are ‘portrayed and confirmed.’

These characterizations of Bourdieu’s tend to isolate Bourdieu’s ideas from the political and social context in which Bourdieu functioned. Bourdieu’s later career as a (perhaps reluctant) public intellectual calls attention to his own belief in the possibility and importance of resistance.

Furthermore, Bourdieu’s relevance to Marxist approaches to communication can easily be obscured by classifying him as a neo-Durkheimian. As I have argued elsewhere, Bourdieu’s ideas—and habitus is the exemplar of this—come largely out of a Marxist notion of praxis and reproduction. Bourdieu returns repeatedly to Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, with its emphasis on “human sensuous activity” and “practice.” If a political economist of communication ever wanted ammunition in the ongoing dispute with more idealist modes of thought, Bourdieu’s emphasis on praxis understood as habitus offers an excellent place to start. At the same time, his conception of habitus proves to be much less rigid than Garnham imagined. Habitus, after all, is not about rules being followed, and resistance to these rules so much as it is about the structures that are lived in, and conveyed through, everyday life. As such, habitus does not seal off resistance so much as it becomes the starting point for envisioning the possible forms that resistance could take. In this sense,
Garnham and other readers of Bourdieu mistake habitus for a list of rules that must be followed and reproduced. Linking habitus to political economy gives us one avenue for a more productive sense of the term.

**Habitus: The Political Economy Angle**

Much like habitus, the political economy of communication is a moving target. The political economy approach is associated with a wide range of theoretical standpoints. Vincent Mosco has properly defined what political economy (of communication, and of anything else) involves. He offers a bona fide ‘big tent’ sense of political economy, examining the “central qualities that characterize the approach.”

One central quality is “the goal of understanding social change and historical transformation.” Another is “an interest in examining the social whole or the totality of social relations that make up the economic, political, social, and cultural areas of life.” He finds that political economy “is also noted for its commitment to moral philosophy, understood as both an interest in the values that help to create social behavior and in those moral principles that ought to guide efforts to change it.”

Here Mosco emphasizes that “social praxis, or the fundamental unity of thinking and doing, also occupies a central place in political economy.” Mosco interprets this, rightly, as an indication that political economists are not, and should not, be content simply to allow scholarship and practice to be comfortably separate fields of activity. An even broader sense of what Mosco means here can link political economy’s goals with Bourdieu’s habitus.

Mosco’s “rethinking” of political economy suggests that political economy be grounded in “critical epistemology.” By this he means that a renewed political economy approach “social life as a set of mutually constitutive processes, acting on one another in various stages of formation, and with a direction and impact that can be comprehended only in specific research.” In pursuit of this, he tells us that “it is…more useful to develop starting points that characterize processes rather than simply to identify relevant institutions.”

Mosco points to commodification and hegemony as the starting points for a political economy conceptualized in this manner. His discussion of commodification identifies praxis as the central concern, noting that, in its past treatments of commodification, “political economy has tended to concentrate on media content and less so on media structures and the labor involved in media production.” He identifies recent research that has successfully expanded on the meaning of political economy, and lauds this research for having “broadened the analysis of audience research to examine audience history and the complex relationship of audiences to the producers of commercial culture, including the Internet.” In addition to commodification, Mosco tells us that structuration represents an important starting point for his redefined political economy. Here, he points to the need to “[broaden] the conception of social class from its structural or categorical sense, which defines it in terms of what some have and others do not, to incorporate both a relational and a constitutional sense of the term.” It is under the rubric of structuration that Mosco identifies hegemony as an important part of the scholarship on political economy, describing hegemony as “a
lived network of mutually constituting meanings and values, which, as they are experienced as practices, appear to be mutually confirming.”33

To return to Mosco’s grander point here (as I see it), a broader sense of the political economy of the media will focus less on the structures (institutions, organizations) per se, and more on the praxis connected to certain institutional arrangements. Political economy of communication in the U.S. is often thought of in terms outlined by Herbert Schiller and Dallas Smythe, arguably the most influential political economists of communication.

Herbert Schiller’s approach involves a kind of frank structuralism that could not link up more clearly with the goals of political action. Schiller kept a steady focus on large corporations, emphasizing the world of the “cultural industries.”34 Other institutions play a role in Schiller’s analysis. He paid careful attention to U.S. law, to the collusion between governments and large media corporations, to the consumer goods producers, and to changes in technology as they adjust the control mechanisms of these institutions.35 Robert McChesney’s work similarly involves a steady focus on the same major factors, often working from detailed histories.36 And, of course, Dallas Smythe’s ideas broadened the consideration of political economy dramatically, while still emphasizing the roles played by institutions in history.37

If the concept of habitus is, as stated above, a word that points to the structuring structures that both constrain and generate the set of practices/strategies that are dispersed systematically and unevenly through a society, Bourdieu’s emphasis on praxis in habitus can be seen to link up with something quite similar to Mosco’s sweeping vision of political economy of communication. I am struck by the similarity between Mosco’s ideas here and Bourdieu’s description of his own scholarly project as “a general science of the economy of practices.”38 We see tremendous overlap in political economy and Bourdieu’s ideas when we look at some of Bourdieu’s starting points: the expansive sense of exchange, the similarly expansive senses of ‘capital’ and of labor,39 his pointed critique of rational choice theory,40 and the “anticipation of profits” from symbolic exchange.41 Though I restrain my comments here to the utility of the concept of habitus, this concept represents only a starting point for the integration of Bourdieu’s ideas with other materialist approaches.

Here, I suggest two major arenas where the concept of habitus can be applied to the political economy of communication: media production and media audiences. In the hands of a political economist, habitus can be thought of as the site of internalization of commodity relations in daily practices. This applies not just to knowledge workers, but to everyone, to whole classes of people, where social relations and power are reified in daily actions structuring their choices and meanings as workers—who are tacitly bid to accept the terms of capital as doxa—and as consumers, who practice meanings and values in relations essential to the cycle of capital.42

Applying the concept of habitus to media production may seem relatively uncontroversial. In part, this is because some important work in political economy has already done much of the heavy lifting to get us closer to a sense of the fine mesh of praxis on the production side of media. Bernard Miège reminds us—in the con-
text of the contemporary ‘information revolution’—of “the importance that communication is presently gaining in the capitalist mode of production in the world economy in the context of globalization and liberalization.”43 One of the take-home points here is that the mode of production matters not only in terms of how large corporations and regulators relate to each other, but also in terms of how it shapes praxis, or, in the language of habitus, how it shapes the semi-conscious strategies at work in media labor. Similarly, Thomas Streeter has addressed how the field of possibilities was constructed culturally amongst the creators and managers of Internet technologies in the 1990s.44 Dallas Smythe’s less recent ideas are relevant here, too. Crucial to Smythe’s sense of political economy of communication, after all, was a sense for how commodification operated in media markets to construct audiences as commodities.55 In terms of how praxis operates on the production side of media, Smythe gets us beyond thinking only about regulations, corporations, and other large structures. What he was describing, after all, was how media producers come to understand and act toward audiences in specific ways, given the particular arrangements of corporate activity, and the over-arching demands of the capitalist marketplace. Smythe’s approach was something much closer to the more detailed political economy of labor that Mosco (above) calls on us to perform.

A number of scholars have followed up vigorously (if not always explicitly) on Smythe’s work, exploring at length the idea of how audiences have been commodified. Again, we find reason to believe that habitus can help us to address (if not resolve) questions in political economy of communication. Eileen R. Meehan, following clearly from Smythe, argued that television and radio ratings represent a kind of domination of the audience, where the process of commodification of people has significant meaning for how media texts are produced.46 W. Russell Neuman tells a familiar story of how ratings create imperatives for programmers to ignore minority tastes so as to capture large audiences.47 James Beniger’s “control revolution” described something very similar to this, and though Beniger’s emphasis is more Weberian than Marxian, one can detect the same sense of commodification of the audience at work. Fernando Bermejo’s description of how Internet audiences are constructed and commodified represents a clear (and productive) sense for how the ideas of Smythe and Beniger can be joined in an effort to analyze the sens practique at work in constructing audiences.48

The application of the concept of habitus to questions of political economy help us to explain why the larger structural arrangements matter. In terms of habitus, structural arrangements do not so much matter in and of themselves, but matter a great deal in terms of how they arrange action, construct sets of possibles, tacitly introduce forms of self-censorship, and embody (literally) the rules of the game. From this vantage point, the capitalist mode of production matters in terms of its power to install doxa—taken-for-granted bits of knowledge—in the bodies of knowledge laborers, and it is the job of the political economist to attempt to uncover these doxa, not as ideologies, but as lived habits that emerge from the social structure. It would be wrong to say that the grander structural arrangements do not matter, but certainly it is hard to understand how they matter without paying attention to how producers relate to their labor. As with Marx’s cobbler, the effect of alienation comes from his relation to his labor, as it changes as a result of the devel-
opment of modern capitalism; simply telling us who owns the shoe factory does not give us the whole story.

Applications of habitus to media production are admittedly not easy to find. The term seems to resist importation into communication. Eric Darras has applied habitus to the situation of French journalists, where the “structural subordination of the journalistic field is made possible by journalistic self-censorship via the more or less confused absorption of the relative importance of political institutions (the constitution, the government, the Congress, the dominant parties, and especially in France, the National School for Administration...).” As Darras puts it, the “most productive journalists are those who have best assimilated the theodicies that support representative government and the social system as a whole (the real power of politicians; the political participation of the ‘people’; the ‘separation of powers’; etc.).” For Darras, habitus in journalism operates as a way to find the institution in the agent; in a sense applying constructivist insights to structural arrangements. I would argue that Dan Schiller’s *Objectivity and the News* does much the same thing, taking structural arrangements in the press and demonstrating how they became implicated in the practices—such as the practice of objective reporting—became the practical consequence in day-to-day reporting. Gaye Tuchman’s study of objectivity in the press gives us, in this sense, a similar accounting of objectivity, as a strategic ritual that has emerged from structural arrangements, half-understood by the journalists themselves.

The broader point to be taken from these studies that either use habitus (perhaps at arm’s length) or represent parallels to habitus-based analyses is as follows: First, institutions do matter, just as political economists of communication have said for years. Second, the mode in which these institutions matter may be more complicated than political economists have usually presumed. Instead of operating merely through blunt ‘control’ (though there is that, too), it is the oft-misrecognized practices—and the actor’s broader habitus, obtained from schooling, learning the ropes, etc.—at every step in the chain of production where the action is. The political economist of communication, following Bourdieu’s lead, would take the existing structural arrangements into account, but then the foregrounded analysis would focus not on the Bagdikian-ian questions of who owns what, but on the meaningful-because-prosaic facts of production, from the point of view of the laborer. As is clear from these canonical examples from the study of journalism, this has been done before, but there is much room for further analysis from political economists.

Production is not the only part of the communication process to play a role in the habitus-informed political economy of communication. Bourdieu was very clear in pointing out that production takes the form that it does largely because of the proleptic assessment of audience response. In this sense (and this is largely congruent with insights from the structuration approach in political economy), audience members are themselves part of the game. We can benefit from no small amount of audience-based research on communication when considering how to apply habitus to the political economy of communication. Richard Butsch’s history of U.S. audiences from mid-eighteenth through late twentieth centuries tells us much about how audiences have been constructed by producers, expected to behave, and related to media texts. In his conclusion, he emphasizes the ambiguities of audience practice,
noting that “[a]n audience practice may be at one level resistant and another incorporate, at one level and another passive, at one private and individual and another public and collective.”53 Roger Silvertone’s attempts to document the “experience of television in all its dailiness, in all its factuality”54 gets at some of what makes reception a structured and structuring affair, quite apropos of Bourdieu’s habitus. David Morley’s work takes a similar approach, examining how social structure relates to audiences’ interpretive frameworks, with a particular concern for getting past television as “text”.55 Through reference to audience research, itself often taken (wrongly) as a prolonged and populist rebuttal of political economy of communication, one can find some sense of how emphasizing media praxis gives us a more refined sense of the operations of power in the media.

With habitus in mind, the political economist has a reinvigorated sense of how audiences relate to power. The audience experience can be re-envisioned in terms of how it involves audience members’ pre-existing sense of possibilities for what is deemed: entertaining, informative, objective, satisfying, or inoffensive. For some very good reasons, this kind of research would resemble the kinds of audience research that builds on Gramscian models of hegemony. Like Gramsci, Bourdieu emphasized doxa as common sense, and identified this as a major part of the social processes of reproduction and domination. Unlike many uses of Gramsci, however, an incorporation of habitus into the perspective of political economy would move scholarship away from discourse and ideology, and toward praxis.56

A decent sense of what the focus on habitus can do for the political economy of audiences could be envisioned in terms of an issue that Robert Entman describes at work in journalism, whereby something like Say’s Law—in which supply creates its own demand—can be found in effect. Entman argues that it is difficult for the public to demand better journalism if they have not been exposed to better journalism. In the journalistic field, Entman finds a market that is limited by the fact that the consumers do not know how to pursue options that the market itself has never made available to them.57 Robert W. McChesney describes the same process, and concludes that “[t]here is no way to use the market to express nonmarket values—aside from withdrawing from media altogether—which is hardly an option, nor should it be.”58 This is an important insight, but it leaves much left to the imagination regarding how exactly the audience has come to demand that which has been supplied. Habitus may provide some of the answer.

Through a consideration of habitus, we could attempt to understand processes of production and reception as reciprocally-structuring (which is not to say that audiences and producers have equal power) events in the communication process, whereby audience members come to develop a sense of the possible through repeated exposure to a specific field of options. From these options, individuals develop a sense not only of what is possible, but also of where they fit in, and how their own consumption habits can yield the kind of symbolic profits they hope to gain. This is the “sense of the game” that Bourdieu described so often, and it is what programmers attempt to account for in their increasingly detailed research about media markets. Media supply creates its own demand as media markets become more carefully attuned to specific institutional arrangements, which is to say, as media producers’ gambits yield certain successes (in the form of sales or rat-
ings), and then capitalize on previous successes with other similar programming strategies. This ‘herd mentality’ of producers is one of the most enduring insights into the political economy of communication. In terms of habitus, it represents the coalescence of certain strategies for programming, which are rewarded for past successes; programmers internalize the logic of the particular market in an almost content-neutral manner. On the audience side, supply creates its own demand as audience members themselves internalize the options made available to them as the entirety of the field of possibilities, and “aestheticize the necessary,” find themselves without other options, and demand that which has been assigned to them. This is rule-like behavior, though, pace Bourdieu, almost no one (from producers to audience members) is following any uttered rule. It is emergent practice, self-perpetuating, and not as stable as it seems within the terms it offers for itself.

The application of habitus to media consumption and reception is not completely new. As with studies of production, there is more to be done, and again, the emphasis on praxis represents the hope and the difficulty of this kind of scholarship. There is some good news, however. If political economists apply habitus to reception, they will have answered some of the oft-repeated arguments made by those who claim that political economy treats communication as if it were exactly like every other industry. Greater attention to the processes of meaning construction will give political economists something more to say when faced with the charge that political economic models deny the experience of the audience. What political economists need to do is not so much force the existing ways of thinking about media into audience studies so much as to allow their own understandings of power to become less brittle, more open to the embodied modes of multiple sites of power. This will not end the debate with cultural studies over final determination of meaning. However, it may lead to more meaningful interactions between different schools of thought on the issue, as opposed to the methodologically predetermined fights that come right out of the unexamined assumptions of many sides of this debate.

**Habitus and the Methodology of Political Economy**

More than one daunting question haunts the effort to incorporate Bourdieu’s habitus into a program for political economy of communication. One of the most important for scholars would be this: what methods should be used to study habitus as it relates to political economy?

In considering the answer to this question, one finds a renewed appreciation for large-scale structural political economic studies. Herbert Schiller’s work, for instance, suffers from frustrating gaps in its attempt to address the communication process. Still, he and others from the institutionalist school of political economy successfully found a method for studying media power that called attention to systems of domination without sealing off the potential for resistance. Much of this work benefits from the social scientific legitimacy that is associated with looking at structures, itself indirectly linked to mainstream trends in sociology.

The successes of existing political economic models of communication throw
into high relief some of the problems that come from thinking about habitus. To study habitus as it relates to political economy of communication would be much better if habitus were, in the language of social science, a more readily operationalized concept. To be blunt: we do not have tools for measuring habitus directly. Even more frustratingly, the concept of habitus invites a kind of reflexivity that challenges the very idea of a neutral standpoint from which to understand the workings of any particular practical sense of the world. As Bourdieu made very clear, the workings of habitus are not suspended in the world of science, or of social science.62

Still, Bourdieu clearly intended this as a provocation, an ‘invitation to reflexivity,’ and not as a rejection of the possibility of knowing. In this spirit, I suggest that the methods of political economy of communication should retain the macro sense of institutional structures, but match this with careful attention to strategies of media production and consumption as conceptualized in terms of habitus. The methods for this kind of study have been executed in the context of political economy before, but are more widely associated with cultural studies and organizational communication.

Here it is worth considering the methods that Bourdieu himself used in the course of his career. He was justifiably well known for employing numerous methods. He started off largely as a field researcher; his formulations of the term habitus come largely from his research on the Kabyle in Algeria.63 In his work amongst the Kabyle, one finds exactly the kind of emphasis on nuance and praxis that field research should involve. It is worth pointing out that similar field-based research can retain a critical perspective. Critical ethnography, as described by Jim Thomas,64 gives us a good sense of how a qualitative and field-based methodology can be linked with specific critical ends. The lessons of critical ethnography are apposite for the attempt to bridge habitus with political economy, an attempt already made quite successfully by Manjunath Pendakur, who helpfully outlined how ethnography could inform political economy in his analysis of media audiences in an Indian village.65

Qualitative methods were not the only arrows in Bourdieu’s quiver. He was no stranger to survey research, and much of his work that dealt with social class—including his work with Passeron on French educational structures and Distinction—involved a careful use of survey data. Survey data were not simply dumped into hypotheses, but were pored over, to be taken relationally, as Bourdieu repeatedly and rigorously attempted to construct the fields of possibilities in which social actors lived.

For political economists of communication, the methodological significance of Bourdieu’s work is its insistence on refusing to dissolve anything in a solution of ideological analyses, and on focusing on praxis and lived experience. From a Bourdieu-ian point of view, a focus on media institutions and structures simply would not be sufficient, because of this focus’s lack of attention to everyday praxis. Knowledge about political and corporate bodies and the formal rules they propagate does not tell us very much about precisely how domination is worked out. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s ideas provide us with a way to get past the economic determinism in some strains of Marxian thought. Instead of responding to the problems
of economic determinism through an embrace of populist assertions of agency, Bourdieu’s broader sense of domination turns domination into a more multivariate affair, where degrees of autonomy do exist in the confines of specific fields, and economics is not always the prime mover.

It is worth pointing out that the methodological refinements to be undertaken in a political economy that builds on Bourdieu’s ideas would allow political economy greater flexibility to understand new media. Here, notice that Dallas Smythe’s ideas, for instance, were created in the context of advertising-driven mass media of the 1970s. This straightforward mass communication approach was utterly appropriate for that time, and though Smythe’s model remains relevant, political economy generally seems tied to models that presume the anti-democratic tendencies in the asymmetry between large mass communication corporations and dominated audiences.

One response to this, of course, might be to presume that, in the age of new media, corporate control does not matter any more. Henry Jenkins argues something similar to this in his recent *Convergence Culture*, where he paints a picture of a new media environment where the line between producers and consumers has become almost non-existent. Jenkins fend[s of] any who might accuse him of technological determinism by pointing to the long history of convergence. For Jenkins, the “collective intelligence” that is fostered in the current media environment is not something that emanates from the technology per se, but from the users and producers themselves, acting in harmony. Political economists have been quick to point out that Jenkins confines his discussion only to certain rarefied parts of new media practice, and that structural issues are essentially defined out of his project.

I propose that political economists address new media much as Vincent Mosco suggests, with a broad sense of domination at work in the practical, interstitial parts of the process of mediation, with less of a focus on ownership models of power. The best response to Jenkins’ ideas, I think, would be to apply his same methods (e.g. ethnography) to different parts of the media production/consumption continuum. Clearly, we still need to understand ownership and institutional control in the current ‘new’ media regime. However, the modes of domination at work have rarely more clearly made praxis the central concern. What would Bourdieu do? Amongst other things, he would probably point out that the types of practice that Jenkins hails as a rather positive development of convergence culture are not evenly distributed, and that “produsage” itself represents a potential tool for domination, as a potential form of misrecognition of a less than democratically arranged set of relationships.

More precisely, new media currently give us a rare chance to understand praxis, because they often find the media industry changing how they do things. Methodologically, it is in a sense fortunate that new media bring with them new ways of producing and receiving culture. A moment of cultural-technological change may give us the opportunity to unravel some of what has been going on—and some of what is coming—in the world of praxis. I suggest that many of Bourdieu’s favorite themes in his research (misrecognition, le sens pratique, adjustments in fields of play) become more accessible to the researcher when they are in flux. For instance, the popular music industry is currently experiencing difficult times. Old models for
generating profit no longer work like they used to, new media have not been effi-
ciently monetized yet, the existing laws for intellectual property still highlight con-
tradictions in the field more than the industry would prefer. For the agents in-
volved—including audience members and consumers—this represents a time when
well-worn subject positions become describable simply because they do not work
as seamlessly as they once did. Bourdieu’s strategies, in this context, become some-
what more explicitly thought-out because the existing models guiding practice have
broken down. For the political economist of communication, it would be a pity in a
moment like this to focus only on institutions when the attempt to structure praxis
in the day-to-day has become fleetingly available. Of course, it would also be a pity
to give in to the “digital sublime” and assume that these institutions have sud-
denly become irrelevant. In this sense, new media provide new opportunities for
political economists to remain relevant.

Political Action

When considering the relevance of habitus to the political economy of communica-
tion, it is worthwhile to consider the upswing of this protean idea in terms of the
modes of political action it may enable and/or stifle. As I have already related,
Garnham has suggested that Bourdieu’s ideas—including habitus—were too total-
izing, too much lacking in any sense of political possibility to be of much use to
anyone with a political program in mind. His critique of Bourdieu’s ideas closely
resembles the critiques of functionalist and pragmatist inquiry in the social sci-
ences. Much as both functionalism and pragmatism have been critiqued from the
left for simply making it seem as if ‘that which is, is good,’ habitus threatens to
become so broadly applicable and merely descriptive as to be useless for political
action.

It makes some sense to examine how some forms of political economical in-
quiry do link up with political action. The most obvious and helpful case would be
the structuralist political economy I have described above. In Robert McChesney’s
work, for instance, activism flows directly from the analysis. Classically, McChes-
ney puts powerful institutions into historical perspective, shows us how their inter-
ests conflict with the interests of the public, and then links this to activism that
takes dead aim at these institutions. The activist network Free Press grew out of a
(correct) sense that large institutions matter, that their control over communication
processes has become problematic, and that we need activism to change the exist-
ing power structures. As Steve Macek points out, FreePress has “discovered effec-
tive ways of connecting critical communication research to political action, and has
figured out how to mobilize enormous number of people to fight for a more democ-
ratic, more equitable media system.”

In light of this, it is perfectly appropriate to wonder how such a scholarly-
seeming term as habitus can create any leverage for activists. I believe there are at
least two things that habitus can help us accomplish as activist scholars: it can help
us to notice the commonalities that link the interests of knowledge workers, and it
can allow us to gain a sense of reflexivity in our politics.
First, using habitus as a starting point in political economy of communication calls attention to the practices of everyday life. Perfectly consistent with this would be a growing realization of how communication scholars and other knowledge workers are parts of overlapping, if not identical, processes in the emergent economic order. Here the key term is ‘knowledge labor.’ Vincent Mosco describes numerous definitions of knowledge labor, almost all of which include professors and teachers. He then outlines how the very term knowledge labor creates a potential for solidarity between professors and other knowledge workers, broadly defined. This emphasis may be especially important if “labor convergence” is indeed a going concern.69 This does not instantly mean that academics can now comfortably define themselves as blue collar. As Mosco explains, “[m]yths that conjure one big union of knowledge workers have their values, but can get seriously in the way of thinking clearly.”70 And this brings us back to Bourdieu. The very idea of knowledge labor re-works Marxian ideas about class to the point where it may make sense to hold on to Marx’s emphasis on praxis, while departing from his more crustean sense of class. Bourdieu’s habitus preserves the focus on praxis, domination, and reproduction, while allowing a more flexible definition of class, in a manner that dovetails smoothly into the questions faced by knowledge workers.

The second thing habitus can do for activist scholars is to point the way to reflexivity in our scholarship and our activism. That Bourdieu saw scholarship as something that could link up with political action is apparent in the arc of his career. An elite sociologist for years, he became a more outspoken public intellectual toward the end of his life. This later turn to public intellectual work did not come out of nowhere, and one lesson to be drawn from this may relate to Bourdieu’s grander concern with reflexivity; in many ways, Bourdieu could be said to have taken careful note of his own position in the social topography when considering his own public activism. He was very much interested in the idea of autonomy and of its opposite: heteronomy. Wary of simply plugging himself into a media landscape that he described in On Television as a threat to the autonomies of politics and journalism from the laws of the market,71 Bourdieu seems to have carefully chosen when to speak, how to speak, and how to, in his own terms, ‘anticipate profits.’

Examples of what is to be gained by using habitus as an analytic tool are not so difficult to envision. First, use of the term would allow activists to redirect efforts already focused on concentration of media ownership. While concentration remains an important issue for activism, habitus would lend itself to an adjusted activist approach, one that would focus less on concentration per se than on structures of labor and meaning that emerge from capitalist media enterprise. This would give activists more to say about markets where there may be more competition. Activism that starts with habitus as a concern need not address only the parts of the media landscape that feature more obvious concentration of media ownership. Instead, the focus would be placed (re-placed, some might say) on how capitalism lends itself to certain practices, content management, and production that conflict with democratic ideals. Such activism would focus less on News Corporation or Comcast, and more on the processes that made such corporatization possible in the first place.
Similarly, activism stemming from the concept of habitus could start with a sense of the commonalities between media scholars and other media laborers. Here, there are two questions to be faced by any potential media scholar/activist: First, whose interests are supported by my work? Second, with what parties can I find common cause in the search for democracy? The first question demands that media scholars inquire into their own sources of support, the structures from which they draw strength, and how these relate to the questions they ask. It is not very controversial to point out that some media scholars will find that they have much in common with market researchers, media planners and buyers, and administrators who seek to perpetuate the existing order of things. The results of such analysis may prove unsettling, but are a necessary starting place for an autonomous scholarship of the media. The second question lines up media scholars’ understandings of their own work with the places occupied by other media laborers (broadly construed), and leads us to consider how the structures (in and around us) that shape us also shape media workers of all stripes, including web designers, screenwriters, journalists, and the surprisingly broad swath of laborers whose work often goes unacknowledged as media-relevant (e.g. the employees of UPS). For all of this, the emphasis on habitus leads to a more informed conception of the struggles of which we are already a part (whether we know it or not).

Surprisingly consistent with the goal of reflexivity, which Bourdieu considered to be “the absolute prerequisite to any political action by intellectuals,” 72 was Bourdieu’s own goal of creating “new forms of communication between researchers and activists.” The goal here was not to formulate a specific program for research or political action, but to do something grander: to create structures to give to social research the kind of (relative) autonomy from market forces that any such form of inquiry would require. Political economy of communication would, in this sense, benefit from turning to the public, taking common cause with knowledge workers and other workers (the distinction between the two has never been less distinct), and setting itself to the understanding of the prosaic workings of economic (and yes, other kinds of) power. 73

Notes
1. Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 12.
3. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 73
4. Ibid., 78.
6. Bourdieu, In Other Words, 125.
7. Swartz, Culture & Power, 290.
10. Ibid., 45.
13. For more on the lack of Bourdieu in the field of communication, please see Jefferson Pooley’s “Lost in Translation.”
15. Ibid., 180.
16. Ibid., 182.
17. Swartz, Culture & Power.
19. Park, “The Convictions of Reflexivity”
23. Ibid., 89.
24. Ibid., 89.
25. Ibid., 90.
26. Ibid., 90.
27. Ibid., 95.
28. Ibid., 95.
29. Ibid., 96.
30. Ibid., 97.
31. Ibid., 97-98.
32. Ibid., 101.
33. Ibid., 103.
34. Schiller, Culture, Inc., 46.
35. Here I am thinking in particular about Schiller’s work in Communication and Cultural Domination, Culture, Inc.; Information Inequality, and Mass Communications and American Empire.
36. Here I am thinking of McChesney’s Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy; The Problem of the Media; and Rich Media, Poor Democracy.
37. Smythe’s focus on structural arrangements is noticeable in his best known work: “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism” and Dependency Road.
39. For more on this, see Craig Calhoun’s “Habitus, Field, and Capital,” 68.
40. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 124-126.
42. The author thanks Lee Artz for this way of putting it.
44. Streeter, “Romanticism in Business Culture.”
45. Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism.”
46. Meehan, “Ratings and the Institutional Approach”
49. Darras, “Media Consecration of the Political Order,” 166.
50. Ibid., 166.
51. Dan Schiller, *Objectivity and the News*.
52. Tuchman, “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity.”
55. See Morley, *Television Audiences & Cultural Studies*.
56. I believe that Gramsci himself emphasized praxis, though many media researchers have used his ideas to focus simply on the ‘content’ of culture, a move that Bourdieu criticized frequently
59. A classic example of this is the under-rated Duncan MacDougald, Jr. consideration of radio programming entitled, “The Popular Music Industry.”
60. cite Bourdieu on “aesthetization of the necessary”
61. see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, for a particularly compelling sense of what happens when Parsonsian structuralism meets Marxist sociology.
62. The best examples of his distaste for the presumption of illusio—taking the stakes of the game for fully real things—in the workings of academia can be found in Bourdieu’s *Homo Academicus* and *Pascalian Meditations*.
64. Thomas, *Doing Critical Ethnography*.
65. Pendakur, “Political Economy and Ethnography”
66. Jenkins, *Convergence Culture*.
68. Macek, “From the Weapon of Criticism to Criticism by Weapons,” 238
70. Mosco, *The Laboring of Communication*, 47.

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