Terrorism, Torture And Television: “24” in Its Context

John Downing

The discussion begins with a comparative overview of violence against civilians in war, in terroristic actions, and in torture. The comparisons are between the USA since the 9/11 attacks, Britain during the civil war in Northern Ireland 1969-2000, and France during and since the Algerian armed liberation struggle of 1954-62. The discussion covers the general issues involved, and then summarizes existing research on British and French media representations of political violence. The article then proceeds to a critical-discourse analysis of the US Fox Television channel’s highly successful “24” dramatic series. The series has been far and away the most extended televisual reflection to date on the implications of 9/11. Political violence, counter-terrorism and torture are central themes. An argument is made that the series constructs a strangely binary imaginary of extremist and moderate “Middle Easterners” while simultaneously projecting a weirdly post-racist USA. In particular, the series articulates very forcefully an ongoing scenario of instantaneous decision-making, under dire impending menace to public safety, which serves to insulate U.S. counter-terrorist philosophy and practice from an urgently-needed rigorous public critique.

“…one of the immanent possibilities of the state’s monopoly of violence is the transgression of those very legal frameworks which in theory act to limit its arbitrariness. It is at this point that we talk of states becoming terroristic, or of employing unacceptable techniques (such as torture) whose use they themselves would wish to deny, dissimulate or euphemize.”

Introduction: violence against civilians, past and present

The main focus of this discussion is the political discourse of the Fox TV series “24” (2001 - ). To grasp its likely input into U.S. culture, however, we need to set it in a much larger comparative and indeed historical (Downing 2007) political and cultural context.

Sadly, the deliberate infliction of death and mutilation on non-combatants - as war policy - is hardly new to human history. David rose greatly in his public’s esti-
mation when he returned from battle against the Philistines with a liquidation count of ten thousand, ten times King Saul’s, and later with two hundred of their severed penises, a hundred more than Saul had demanded as bride-price for his daughter (1 Samuel 18). The Mongol invaders were a byword for the extreme violence they meted out to what we would now call civilian populations (although once they had established that they would stop at nothing, their ongoing rule was much less harsh). The holy Christian crusaders extended this type of treatment to anyone who resisted their looting, Christian or Muslim. At the same time, in the latter centuries of European war, perhaps as a result of the comprehensive devastation of the Thirty Years War, the tradition grew up in that sphere of the planet that wars were only to be fought by soldiers against other soldiers. (Under the rubric of racism, by contrast, genocidal campaigns against indigenous Americans or Australians were mostly excused or even celebrated.)

World War II and its precursors – the British onslaught on Kurdish and Arab villages in Iraq in 1920, the Japanese military invasion of China, the Italian assault on Ethiopia, Gernika - put an end to the intra-European code in practice, although the old public rhetoric persists to this very day in terminology such as “smart bombs” and “minimum collateral damage.” That rhetoric’s continued use pays tribute in some measure to the persistent reluctance of most humans to contemplate the savagery of war, for if that were not so, these soothingly hypocritical obfuscations would not need to be deployed. In particular, the old soldier-to-soldier battles evaporated with the saturation (“carpet”) bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 and again in 1944, of Dresden in August 1944, and of some sixty other German cities amounting to 20% of the total residential area of the country, killing 300,000 civilians. This was followed by the saturation bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in March 1945 (resulting in some 170,000 deaths), which then culminated in the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The predominance of the Air Force and of bombing from a safe distance in U.S. military strategy dates from that period (Sherry 1987), a strategy which the South East Asian War from 1965 to 1975, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and the Bush Administration’s threats against Iran in late 2007, demonstrated to be still paramount. A frequently cited study by Sivard (1991) suggests that over the 20th century the civilian percentage of wartime deaths rose from 5% in World War I through over 50% in World War II, to around 90% by 1990. Thus the gigantic 15,000-pound “daisy-cutter” bombs deployed in Afghanistan - the total heartlessness of this mocking military term is truly evocative of the hypocrisy of America’s democratic global mission - had a pristine pedigree. The cluster bombs so beloved of the U.S. military high command both multiply immediate civilian casualties and scatter the equivalent of landmines and booby-traps that will be set off by casual contact later (Wiseman 2003), especially when projected from remote ground-based missile-launchers. Depleted-uranium bomb casings have their own long-term civilian impact, yet to be fully assessed by independent scientists.

Yet reduce direct U.S. army casualties by bombing at a distance, and you reduce domestic opposition to war, especially since the Vietnam disaster. The high proportion of Black and Latino soldiers in the U.S. Army also muffles public reaction to their deaths and mutilation, not in the abstract, but in the sense of their hav-
ing close social connections to the White majority. The more that opposition gets
tamped down, the freer across the planet is the hand left to the transnational mili-
tary-industrial complex, with the USA as its principal policeman.

The rhetoric for public consumption on casualties also sharply varies, depend-
ning on whether it refers to the home team or the away team. Probably many Ameri-
cans know that approximately 2,400 were killed in the Pearl Harbor attack, that
58,000 U.S. troops were killed in the South East Asian war, and that approximately
3,000 were killed in the 9/11 attacks. Yet far fewer have an idea even to the nearest
million of the numbers of Japanese or Vietnamese citizens killed in World War II
or in the U.S. war in South East Asia, and as a matter of Bush Administration pol-
icy, no numbers are offered, except in individual news stories, of Iraqis4 or Af-
ghanis killed by U.S. forces since 9/11. If the figures of Iraqi, Vietnamese, Korean
or Japanese civilian deaths had been as consistently rehearsed in U.S. news media
as the losses suffered by Americans, this ignorance would arguably have been
a great deal less. When, in a 1995 Smithsonian Institute exhibit on the nuclear attacks
on Japan this silence looked like it was being ruptured, even that momentary breach
was ferociously sutured over - a full fifty years afterwards.5

On occasions when silence does break, when it is impossible any longer to deny
the scale of annihilation achieved or torture practiced, then the default – and pas-
sonate! – response has generally been to claim that what was done was the lesser
of two evils. Bombed Vietnamese hamlets were better than Communist ones, a
flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki were better than pursuing a long-drawn-out war,
and unless the USA wished to be seen as a permanent soft target, a vast crowd of
Arabs and assorted Muslims definitely had to be seen to have helped to pay for
9/11 with their own lives – predominantly their children’s lives, in practice. This
defense would be much more ethically credible if it did not usually have to wait to
be dragged out in answer to the evidence of huge slaughter, if it were for example
routinely accompanied by a forthright acknowledgment of the monumental levels
of suffering entailed on the other side. “Shock and awe” in Baghdad was not a fire-
work display, as US media exultantly portrayed it. It communicated what the U.S.
army is prepared to do to civilians.

Civilian War Casualties vs.
Terrorism Casualties

Yet after 9/11, “terrorism” – meaning non-state violence against civilians - has be-
come The Pre-Eminent Evil (this capitalization is not meant to imply endorsing it).
It has also become the default rationale around the world among regimes glad to
find a U.S.-supported justification for their own repression of civilians (Russian
forces in Chechnya, for example). “Terrorism’s” conspicuous utility lies in its open-
endedness: no state can be negotiated with to end this war, no one can finally as-
sert with total confidence that there are no terrorists left, and consequently it is mar-
velously pliable, an infinite resource from which to rationalize not only war, but
extensive political surveillance, the abrogation of citizens’ legal protections, secret
trials, and politicized violence: torture, subhuman jail conditions, assassination squads. Piece by piece, perhaps, not all at once on U.S. soil.

Yet in the longer term, as Danner (2004) has forthrightly argued, neither Abu Ghraib, nor Guantánamo, nor the Pakistani or Egyptian jails to which the U.S. government transported terrorism suspects to be tortured in its “extraordinary rendition” programs, need be external to the USA, even though in this transitional period their location was precisely selected so as to be beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and protections. If this logic of “anti-terrorism becomes hegemonic and is endorsed by U.S. courts and major media, there will be seen to be no long-term reason to “keep the gloves on” or defend the general public’s civil liberties inside the USA. (The well-placed will no doubt stay well-placed.)

Thus non-state terrorist attacks on civilians, as opposed to state-sponsored military attacks on civilians, have become quite successfully defined as the ultimate public horror which justifies new forms of state repression and violence (against civilians). The fascist-influenced military government of Argentina in the period 1976-83, covertly supported by the U.S. administration in 1976, similarly justified its systematic arbitrary arrests, torture, and physical disappearance of some 30,000 citizens, mostly labor union leaders, teachers, and psychiatrists, in the name of a war against terrorism, although the statistics clearly demonstrate that deaths and injuries from leftist guerrilla attacks in the years immediately preceding the junta’s coup d’état were puny in number by comparison. This policy was akin to the CIA’s Phoenix Program implemented in southern Vietnam a little earlier, in 1967 (Valentine 2000), which targeted the civilian infrastructure of the National Liberation Front. In the process it eliminated some 40,000 Vietnamese, systematically using torture as well as assassination.

In the USA in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the very muted public debate about interrogation tactics in Afghanistan and Guantánamo, voices were raised arguing that in times of crisis civil protections might have to be put on hold. Prominent among these was Allan Dershowitz, the energetically self-publicizing Harvard University law professor and trial lawyer. His argument was, following the publication of the Aussaresses memoir (see below), that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might be protected if specific warrants to torture were issued in cases of extreme threat. Mr Dershowitz’ thirst for the public spotlight was one thing, but his injection of this logic into public debate certainly did nothing to protect the prisoners in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, who overwhelmingly had only their own blood on their hands, put there by their captors. In a public many of whose members were complaisant with revenge, any revenge, his intervention gave extra fuel to the Bush Administration’s claim that it was resolutely attacking the roots of terrorism.

In a moment we will revisit the logic of this anti-terrorism strategy through a discussion of Chomsky and Herman’s construct of “wholesale” and “retail” terrorism, but first let us review how the U.S. government’s “anti-terrorist” repression strategy has had companions-in-arms over the years, both Britain (unsurprisingly) and France (notwithstanding the frenzied brouhaha over the inter-imperial dissen-sion about the Iraq War). Subsequently, we will compare media coverage of terrorism between these three nations.
Northern Ireland and Algeria: the USA is not an isolate

The story is definitely not just an American one (not that any cause for celebration or relief are to be inferred). We need to recognize how the British regime in Northern Ireland since 1969 and the French regime in Algeria in the period 1954-62 – and since – mirror many of the trends just summarized.

In 2001, retired French general Paul Aussaresses (2001) published a book not only acknowledging that he and the French army had organized the systematic torture of Algerians during the 1954-62 insurgency, but also vigorously defending the practice. He further insisted that top government ministers at the time, such as Socialist Party leaders Guy Mollet and Interior Minister François Mitterrand (subsequently two-term president), had been fully au fait with this; a claim of which we need not feel compelled to be skeptical.

The news was hardly news to those Algerians whose family members had been subjected to torture or murdered, or among relatives of the million or more Algerian villagers forcibly herded en masse into concentration camps. Or to the politically informed, left or right, in France. Nonetheless, the defiant acknowledgment of torture by a general himself involved in it, and the subsequent letter of support signed by some five hundred past and present French generals, was a classic case of insistent justification of merciless brutality the French establishment had long and systematically denied, despite attempts by French and Algerian individuals and organizations, from the first years of the independence war, to get it acknowledged and stopped. That story is not only a fifty-year-old one: the violent repression that plagued Algeria since 1992 represented, very plausibly, a continuation in new circumstances of the Franco-Algerian political economy of terror. Furthermore, Le Pen (leader of the neo-fascist Front National), who had been a paratrooper in Algeria, publicly defended his activities as a torturer during that war. The Franco-Algerian past and present were intimately conjoined.

The Northern Ireland scenario from 1969 onwards held both parallels and contrasts with the foregoing. The numbers killed were far fewer than in Iraq or Algeria, and the patterns of repression and terrorization of populations, whilst evident, were seemingly more restrained. McGuffin (1974) produced the first account of the British army’s interrogation methods (hooding, standing for very long periods of time spread-eagled, subjection to continuous white noise or loud noise, sleep deprivation, beatings, kickings). In a 1978 ruling, the European Court of Human Rights officially declared these practices not to be torture, but nonetheless to be inhuman, degrading and contrary to European Union human rights standards.

There was in addition to these practices, however, a sinister program of targeted assassinations, often organized via the British government’s Force Research Unit or the heavily Loyalist northern Ireland police hierarchy passing the names of alleged Republican terrorists to Loyalist paramilitaries, who would be the ones to do the actual killing. Some one hundred fifty individuals may have been disposed of in this way (Murray 2003). The most notorious case of direct British government executions was the 1988 street liquidation in Gibraltar of three unarmed terrorist suspects by a British government counter-terrorist unit. The overall “shoot-to-kill” policy was long vigorously denied by the government, with one senior police chief
investigating the case forced into early retirement and with another having his office torched to destroy his documentation. Finally in 2003 the Force Research Unit was officially declared to have been a “rogue” unit (Bamber & Palmer 2003). This is, needless to say, fully credible…

Rather obviously, neither in Algeria, Northern Ireland or the “Middle East” was there a unilateral initiative on the part of the French, British or American states. There was an armed insurrection against French colonial rule, designed to bring it to an end, there was a similar insurgency designed to close out British rule in northern Ireland (a majority of deaths were caused by that insurgency), and the murderous 9/11 attacks did happen. In every case, therefore, the insurgents too generated civilian casualties and routinely defined them as the necessary costs of war. The struggle was never a fictional one. In both Algeria, however, and much later in Afghanistan and Iraq, the devastation within the camp of the poor and dispossessed was out of all proportion to the death-toll for the French and the Americans: ten times higher (one million) for Algerians, and in Iraq at the time of writing in 2007, ±200 times higher than 9/11.

Not that the Iraqis had created 9/11. Nor that the U.S. military were the direct agents of this huge carnage in its entirety. But even within the fake rationales of the Bush Administration for its inroads into Afghanistan and Iraq, the sustained savagery of the reprisals was out of all proportion to the devastations of 9/11, and the indescribable planners of the invasion itself were direct agents of the ensuing civil war.

All in all, then, there is a comparable pattern of state behavior across these three nations, involving both torture as a matter of policy, and savagely disproportionate mass retaliation for non-state political violence.

“Democratic” violence: torturing ethical principles

A major issue, however, is how these democratic regimes responded to these situations. Specifically, how they used force. And under the heading of force, the extent to which they bypassed their own laws and their ringing proclamations of democratic principle and of being global moral leaders, to inflict preventive detention, torture and pre-emptive assassination against real insurgents - or simply against random members of the public categorized as potential insurgents as a result of ‘racial’ profiling, by the extension of the label “terrorist” to peaceful oppositionists, and by the ever-escalating dynamic of political surveillance. In other words, the extent to which they themselves used terror – bodily duress as a communication tool - and its ancillaries.

This question inevitably leads us to evaluate the argument by Chomsky and Herman (1979: 85-99) that terrorism comes in two forms, state or “wholesale” violence, and insurgent or “retail” violence. Their position is unequivocal, that during the Cold War era major Western states, the USA in the lead, perpetrated far more numerous and wholesale acts of terrorist violence than did insurrectionary guerrillas and terrorists, yet in those states’ official and media discourse the designation “terrorist” was entirely reserved for the retail merchants of destruction. The states, in this rhetoric, were acting only, and legitimately, to protect or extend national
security, order and democracy. Chomsky and Herman point by way of refutation to the Indonesian bloodbath of 1966, the Indochina War through 1975, and (in their later writings) Latin America and the Middle East, for proof positive that these rationales were and are a grotesque fiction, an up-ending of the truth.

Schlesinger (1991), despite sharp differences at a series of points with Chomsky and Herman’s analyses, sets out to establish fundamentals in his essay cited at the outset, and cites Max Weber, in turn citing Leon Trotsky, that a defining characteristic of the modern state is its claim to a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence. This is not the only facet of the modern state, but arguably it is its bedrock dimension. Thus in the discussion of terrorism, the question shifts from its social-ethical to its political-ethical dimension. The argument becomes a pragmatic one about who is politically enabled to be violent, not the absolutist Gandhian or Tolstoian question of whether anyone is so entitled.

The Chomsky and Herman argument is hard to dismiss in the face of historically grounded statistics of death and destruction. The Israeli-Palestinian statistics of the second Intifada that has dominated world news since 2000, with a ratio of three Palestinians killed for every one Israeli, are actually, notwithstanding their tragic consequences, and without a shred of intent to minimize them, less asymmetrical than many such “wholesale-retail” scenarios. The point is not to blot out those horrors for Palestinians and Israelis or soften them, but to mark the even more terrifying savagery that has marked the state’s supposedly legitimate use of violence against those within the realm it has defined as its own domain (which, for the U.S. regime since Jefferson, has repeatedly meant anywhere it chose in the planet). Unless we are to subscribe to a Hobbesian statolatry, or a kneejerk “America-the-beautiful,” we cannot avert our gaze from this.

Schlesinger’s argument does not move into this terrain, but simply seeks to complicate the nature of political violence, avoiding the heavily freighted associations of the term “terrorism.” But does his, or Chomsky and Herman’s position, imply we should regard “retail” political violence – non-state terrorism - as somehow acceptable? In my judgment, only those predisposed to smear any or all of these writers could reasonably answer in the affirmative. On the other hand, as with Herman and Chomsky’s rhetorical “jiu-jitsu” with the term “propaganda” (Herman & Chomsky 1988), their redefinition of non-state terrorism as “retail” risks downplaying it, not so much ethically as politically. In addition, its capacity to be recuperated as a justification for intensifying the state’s repressive armory and expanding its targets, is a very dangerous dimension to neglect.

There is therefore a triangular issue: (1) the state’s privileged and self-legitimated access to the means of violence, at home and abroad, and how it uses them against civilians - particularly how the U.S. regime does so at this point in history; (2) the political violence of non-state agents; and (3) the uses of terror and torture by the state against presumed or real agents in the second category. We now turn to studies of media coverage of these processes.

Media Coverage of Political Violence: Britain and France
It is impossible to do more than indicate the main lines of research to date, without any pretence that the research literature itself is comprehensive in scope. One of the best studies is by Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott (1983), which seeks to compare, contrast and relate television news and entertainment formats’ representations of terrorism. They note that in the British case there was a time-lag quite often between news coverage and fictional coverage, but that fictional coverage frequently drew upon stories of some months beforehand to lend itself a sense of immediacy, and in so doing often translated the news frame into a dramatic genre. “24” represents an extended illustration of this process.

Most other studies focus just on terrorism and news. Fleury-Villatte (2000) and De Bussière and her colleagues (1999) register, for different periods, passing instances of fictional entertainment, but their emphasis is fundamentally on news, news magazines and documentaries - although Hennebelle et al. (1997) focus on cinematic portrayals. Elsewhere Schlesinger (1987: 205-43) investigates in some detail the often tense relationship between the TV news channels and the British government over coverage of Northern Ireland in the period up to 1986, concentrating on the mostly successful tactics used by successive administrations to intimidate untrammeled reporting of the crisis.

Taken together, the studies by De Bussière and her colleagues, and Fleury-Villatte, covering respectively 1954-62 and 1962-1992, come closest to a connected narrative evaluating a variety of media, but always with a predominant concentration on news and journalism. This tends to lead to a restricted focus just on “what was left out,” including torture, but also the political violence experienced by the pieds-noirs, the harkis and anti-war demonstrators. The power of dramatic representation is relegated to the margins of concern.

At the same time, the Fleury-Villatte study uncovers the fascinating extent to which masses of film footage rejected out of hand at the time by news editors had nonetheless been shot and subsequently archived, reflecting the division of labor and very often of viewpoints between journalists in the field and their safely ensconced superiors. Fleury-Villatte includes as an appendix a lengthy interview with Pierre Abramovici, producer of a documentary on the fascistic Secret Armed Organization (Organisation Armée Secrète, OAS) that set off a terrifying series of anti-civilian bombs and assassinations in 1961-62, in the hope of compelling Algeria to be retained as French. His account of the material he uncovered in the process, that gave the lie to continuing regime propaganda, is illuminating.

British media coverage of Northern Ireland I will summarize much more briefly. For some forty-five years following the initial foundation of the Protestant-dominated state-ling/“province” in 1920, British media pursued a policy of news neglect, malign or otherwise. For most intents and purposes, the Six Counties separated from the rest of Ireland were not on the British media radar. With the rise of the U.S. civil rights movement, and a corresponding student-led movement in Northern Ireland in 1967-69, British media briefly swung into focus and even lent a strong measure of support for the students. But with the resurgence of an armed separatist nationalist movement from 1969 onwards, British broadcast media increasingly operated within the general parameters of government policy.

When they did not, all hell broke loose at government level. It was short of di-
rect soviet-type controls, but nonetheless sufficient to dissuade all but the most
trenchant of journalists and editors from addressing Northern Ireland issues in
depth and with honesty (Schlesinger 1987: xvi-xxi, 205-43; see also Curtis 1984).

Even so there was a period early in the Troubles during which contradictory
tendencies expressed themselves. Bloody Sunday 1971, when British troops opened
fire on a peaceful and unarmed Catholic demonstration in Derry, the second city of
northern Ireland, killing some thirteen and wounding others, was telecast that Sun-
day in considerable detail, as had been the violent attack on an unarmed march
some eighteen months before. The British state immediately whitewashed the mur-
derous attack, only recanting its subterfuges some thirty years later. Yet the visual
image of the dead and wounded at the rally was not one which would smoothly
dissipate.

To summarize: there is no single continuing study of all facets of media repre-
sentation of political violence in either nation. Nonetheless the state’s attempts to
shape and censor terrorism news coverage are self-evident. Equally evident are
sustained attempts by some media professionals to function independently of the
state’s dictates and pressures. The case of “24”, however, represented a very sus-
tained fictional echo of news coverage of Bush Administration policies to combat
terrorism, and a dramatic endorsement of them. It offered only the rarest signs of
dissent, portraying resistance in the Cabinet to a declaration of martial law (Series
5), or to setting up Arab-American internment camps (Series 6). It illustrated well
what Andersen (2006) refers to as “militainment,” the interpenetration of the mili-
tary and entertainment establishments, which in an era of mostly sagging journalis-
tic standards may come to figure as the U.S. public’s chief form of access to current
events.

“24” as a case-study in media representation of
“terrorism”

Originally put into development in 2000, and first heralded in the trade press in
spring 2001, “24” was evidently not sparked by 9/11, although those events and
their aftermath clearly influenced the script’s formation at points thereafter – and,
inevitably, the U.S. and global television audiences’ appropriations of the series.
The series was launched in November 2001, was in due course successfully nomi-
nated for numerous Emmy’s and Golden Globes, and sold very widely around the
world.19 The first series was rebroadcast entire over a holiday weekend, and DVD
versions of each series were soon on the market. At the time of writing, its sixth
season had concluded, and its seventh and eighth were contracted. Thus, while not
the sole U.S. cultural representation of terrorism (and other issues), it was certainly
a very sustained and popular one for its domestic and global audiences. Its domestic
audience routinely numbered 10-13 million viewers. It was in many ways an illus-
tration of Andersen’s (2006: 243-257) thesis of the rise of “militainment.”

Stylistically, it broke some new ground in purporting to operate in real time,
each episode of the serial supposedly consisting of successive one-hour periods in a
single 24-hour day. In fact, aside from the first episode of the second series which
was run without commercials as a loss-leader, it lent itself to easy gibes from the Left, in that the real running time minus ads was closer to 42 minutes than 60. Even nuclear crises, it seemed, would respectfully wait for commercials to air before daring to proceed further. In addition to this, the series writers and producers were committed to the “surprise twist,” which meant that each episode worked very hard to generate a mass of unexpected cliff-hangers.

The fact that there were always at least three simultaneous plots running kept this momentum busy for the most part: (1) terrorist attacks on a presidential candidate, then president (Series 1-3), then assassinated by order of his successor (beginning of Series 5); (2) terrorist attacks on the intimate associates of the chief counter-terrorism operative, the series hero; and (3) convoluted machinations inside the various presidents’ own teams and the counter-terrorism organization, both of them penetrated to various degrees by “the bad guys” (though neither we nor “the good guys” know initially whom to trust). The few individuals in whom, pretty well, the audience was invited to place its unquestioning trust were David Palmer the presidential candidate/president/ex-president, his brother Wayne (president in Series 6), the chief counter-terrorism operative Jack Bauer, his girlfriend in Series 4-6, and a very small scatter of lesser government and counter-terrorism officials. Even these latter, though never suborned, were wont to be distracted from counter-terrorism by purely personal and emotional dramas.

Series 1 mostly revolved around the frantic, fraught attempts of Jack Bauer (Kiefer Sutherland) to protect from terrorist attacks and kidnappers both David Palmer, the presidential candidate (Dennis Haysbert), and his own wife and late teenage daughter. The terrorists seized Bauer’s wife and late teen daughter as hostages to neutralize Bauer’s consummate protection skills for the president. Series 2 revolved around a threat to detonate a nuclear device in Los Angeles, and a plot to unseat David Palmer, now president, from office. Bauer’s daughter found herself once more simultaneously in a series of calamities which constantly threatened to distract Bauer from his prime task, but he manfully continued to juggle both responsibilities successfully, a model to us all of how to combine serious parenting with counter-terrorism dedication. Parallel with Bauer’s family trials went the vivid tensions in the president’s own family, centered principally around his ruthless and power-obsessed wife, Sherry Palmer, a Lady MacBeth/Hillary Clinton character played to the hilt by Penny Johnson Jerald.

Series 3 had Jack Bauer struggling to defeat a conspiracy to unleash a weaponized virus, which initially appeared to involve Mexican drug cartel barons, but was actually led by a disillusioned British ex-operative, Stephen Saunders. In Series 4, Bauer combatted terrorists led by a certain Marwan Habib, who were trying to cause nuclear power plant meltdowns all over the USA, and succeeded in one case. They shot down Air Force One, very seriously wounding the U.S. president on board, and finally launched a nuclear missile at Los Angeles. In the course of these events, Bauer was involved in a firefight inside the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC in which a senior Chinese official accidentally got shot dead by his own embassy guards. They blamed Bauer.

Series 5 saw Bauer once again trying to stop terrorist nerve gas attacks (two actually take place, one in a shopping mall, the other in a hospital). It eventually
emerges that the plot originated with the new U.S. president, and that Bauer’s own brother, not previously seen in the series, was master-minding the operation, intent on protecting US oil interests in Central Asia. At the series end, the plot defeated, a Chinese commando squad seized Jack in retaliation for his role in the embassy attack (Series 4) and to extract information from him.

In Series 6, bearded, exhausted and virtually speechless after 20 months of unsuccessful Chinese interrogation, he had just been released in order to deal with terrorists led by a certain Abu Fayed, but manipulated by an ultra-nationalist Russian general. As the series commenced, these charmers had been setting off bombs in U.S. cities for eleven whole weeks, with 900 fatalities. They also had possession of five ‘suitcase’ nuclear bombs and detonated one 20 miles north of Los Angeles. They eventually were disposed of, but the Chinese and Russian governments were far from being out of the picture, since Chinese operatives had accessed a crucial circuit board from one of the ‘suitcase’ bombs, which could give them access to Russian defense codes, and the Russian government threatened a military attack unless it was restored to them.

The series’ links, like the overall links of News Corp.’s Fox television channel, were very close indeed to the Bush White House, and to the Bush Administration’s vitriolically Rightist media spokespeople such as radio and television commentator Rush Limbaugh. On June 23rd, 2006, a Heritage Foundation press conference celebrated the series, with lead speakers being Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Limbaugh, who took pains to announce that Vice-President Cheney and then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were “huge” fans. Both speakers lavishly praised the show. One of its two producers, Robert Cochran was present to adorn the occasion. Its executive producer, Joel Surnow, was profiled in *The New Yorker* (Mayer 2007). A close friend of Limbaugh’s, Surnow is an energetic and very well-placed media activist for the political Right, who “would like to counter the prevailing image of Senator Joseph McCarthy as a demagogue and a liar” (Mayer: 80).

The three related facets of “24” that I shall examine are its representations of ethnicity; of the “soul” of terrorism; and of torture.

Ethnicity. Ethnicity’s relevance in the series’ narrative to broader social narratives – quite often leaching into religion when the series features characters from the ‘Middle East’ – lies in the political categorization of citizens in periods of real or declared national security crises. In one way or another, this crisis-categorization process has exceptionally deep roots in U.S. historical culture (Downing 2007). ‘Racial’ profiling since 9/11 officially focused on people of a supposedly ‘Middle Eastern’ appearance, although in practice in the USA, Britain and France the prime targets for special searches and stop and search procedures were people of color in general (along with a little dusting of White nursing mothers and seniors in wheelchairs to provide a facade of impartiality).

Thus the situation proved ambivalent, with traditionally salient racist categories, defining African Americans, Latinos, Pacific Asians as both inferior and threatening, jostling for position within the USA with newer ones marking out Arabs, ‘Middle Easterners’, and Muslims as the new prime enemy. These Orientalist frames had been injected with new life during the 1980-81 US Embassy hostage
episode in Teheran, and kept on the simmer through 9/11 and since by routinely anti-Palestinian coverage of the Israeli occupation. In the USA the ideological premise was that in the face of terrorism, and with the claimed total success of the Black civil rights movement, the nation stood united and cohesive, immune to its traditional divisions. “24” articulated this premise incessantly.

In “24” Arabs, ‘Middle Easterners’ and Muslims, the contemporary USA’s prime Other, were systematically binarized into the virtuous and the hideous. Not unlike the “good Indian”/“vicious Indian” binary in the Hollywood Western. For example an imam of one U.S. mosque was shown to be fully cooperative and to find terrorism totally repugnant (Series 2). In the same series another Arab, initially entirely distrusted by Bauer and his associates, ends up seriously injured by terrorists, and then killed by street thugs precisely because he is a ‘Middle Easterner.’ And this, despite the fact that if only they were not so stupid, thuggish and blinded by their prejudices, he is the one person at that point who has the necessary information to stop the nuclear device from being detonated which will inexorably affect them too. In Series 6, the Number 2 in command at the counter-terrorism office is an Arab American woman; and a Muslim rights organization leader is ready to be wrongly incarcerated in order to glean information from suspected terrorists in the same detention center, telling his civil rights lawyer girlfriend “Stop being a lawyer for one damned minute!”

Another Series 2 character, not defined explicitly as Iranian, but with the first name Reza, is scripted initially to appear suspicious, and the potentially sinister fiancé of a naïve White American girl, who does not appear to have a clue what she is getting into. The ultimate plot twist, however, is that she herself is the trained and merciless terrorist who hesitates only a brief second before shooting dead, on her wedding day, both her fiancé and a Black FBI agent. We shall come back to her, but her fiancé turns out to be a tragic and good-hearted victim, not in the least sinister after all. The script here deliberately played with, and against, common expectations in the U.S. public. Yet in Series 6, a well-meaning but tragically naïve White family rushes to protect their neighbor’s teen son Ahmed from another neighbor’s retaliation for the bomb outrages, only shortly afterwards to find him threatening to kill them if they do not help him deliver a nuclear switch to the terrorists.

Thus in many cases the villains are indeed Arabs (lead villains include Syed Ali in Series 2, Habib Marwan in Series 4, Abu Fayed in Series 6), or Iranians (Navi Araz in Series 4), though never explicitly distinguished from Arabs except for those who know Persian names. Thus the TV series reproduces a conventional news media bifurcation of “extremist” vs. “moderate” Muslim/Arab, a splendidly flattening rhetorical exercise pretending to diversity (does not the very adjective “moderate” imply that it would really be preferable, cleaner, not to be a Muslim at all?).

In Series 1, the primary terrorists are Serbs, not Arabs, obviously echoing the systematic demonization of all Serbs that took place during the monumental civil strife in former Yugoslavia in the years leading up to the development of this drama. They are seeking revenge on the presidential candidate and on Jack Bauer, because Bauer had been the lead hitman in an undercover targeted assassination of a Serb terrorist, greenlighted by presidential candidate Palmer when he had been
Senate Intelligence Committee chair. The hit, it emerged, had liquidated several of the terrorist’s family members, but not him or his younger brother. However, as the saga continues, it also emerges that – as with some other terrorist activist groups we see in action during the series – they in turn are being manipulated behind the scenes by individuals who will use them to achieve their fell ends, but will equally discard them without a backward glance. Thus all the Serb terrorists are eventually killed at the close of Series I, but it is made explicit that there are still more deadly – and domestic American! – forces at work, whose agenda to dispose of President Palmer remains to be activated. In Series 5, a leading terrorist is heavily implied to be a Chechen, Vladimir Bierko (unaccountably sporting a British accent).

The series sometimes suggests that Arabs and Muslims are liable to be used as a smokescreen by people with genuinely terrorist designs. In Series 6, the Arab terrorists are being manipulated by an ultra-nationalist Russian general who despises them and ‘the West’ equally and hopes to get both ‘sides’ to destroy each other. Indeed, some of the most dangerous and ruthless people in the series are not only White (Saunders in Series 3, Henderson in Series 5), but also include ranking members of the Los Angeles counter-terrorism unit, and of successive presidents’ cabinets, including the president himself in Series 5 (who looks and sounds remarkably like Richard Nixon).

There is no reference at any point to White racism: even at moments of the highest tension, people disagree with each other, scream at each other, plan to dispose of each other, but with never the whisper of a racist slur or attitude. The urban street-scum in the earlier phase of the series who intermittently erupted into the action to complicate it further, were all White. There are two Black U.S. presidents, yet not even their direst foes trouble to allude to their blackness. The Black Chief of Staff of the counter-terrorism unit, prominent in Series 4 and 5, is a paragon of dedication, so much so that when Bauer is forced to shoot him in Series 6, he permits himself the rare emotional self-indulgence of vomiting. The only dangerous and ruthless Black character is the first President Palmer’s wife, but no one makes derogatory reference to her Blackness. This clearly posits a “post-racist” scenario, where White racism has vanished.

Overall, the series draws upon current national stereotypes aplenty, especially those enshrined in ongoing news media stories – Mexican drug barons, Serb terrorists, Chechen and Russian terrorists, Chinese secret agents, as well as Arab and Iranian terrorists. It produces an absurdly binarized definition of U.S. inhabitants of ‘Middle Eastern’ origin. And it projects a fantastic, denialist remove from the ongoing realities of contemporary U.S. racism. There is plenty in “24” to help inculcate and intensify fear in the U.S. public. There is zero to acknowledge the reality of ‘racial’ profiling on the multiple levels it is practiced, or to block the dehumanization of ‘Middle Easterners’ into stick-figures labeled OK or vicious.

The “soul” of terrorism. There are terrorists aplenty in these series, and they include some of “us,” not least the character of Nina, with whom at the beginning of Series 1, Jack Bauer has just concluded an affair, but who is still his chief assistant. Apparently 120% loyal to him and to his desperate attempts to protect his estranged wife and daughter, she then turns out at the close of Series 1 to have been scheming throughout to have the presidential candidate assassinated – but not for
the Serbian terrorists. Sherry Palmer, the President’s wife, is in cahoots with a high-level group threatening to detonate the nuclear device in Los Angeles. In Series 5, even the U.S. president is organizing a terroristic conspiracy, albeit with the goal of securing Central Asian oil reserves to sustain the U.S. economy. Terrorists-Я-Us! This complicates “24” a little as regards stock tropes of Muslims, Arabs and “Middle Easterners,” and that is in its favor. Women, too, have equal opportunity to be terrorists with men, though in terms of some patriarchal tropes, that makes the situation more than doubly dangerous and especially evil.

At the same time, the representation of one terrorist in Series 2 has a particular fascination. She is Marie Warner, younger sister of Kate Warner and fiancée of the initially suspicious-looking Reza. Both sisters’ father does contract research work for the CIA. Both sisters speak Arabic, Marie seemingly well, Kate more haltingly. Whereas the Serb terrorists in Series 1 had an explicit and comprehensible agenda, to avenge the accidental slaughter of their family by Bauer’s assassination squad on then-Senator Palmer’s orders, Marie Warner was different. She had seemingly imbibed a jihadist netherworld perfectly clear to her, but utterly opaque to reasoning or feeling humans. Prepared virtually without emotion to kill her fiancé on their wedding day, to see her father jailed and interrogated on suspicion of bankrolling terrorists, and even to threaten to shoot her own sister (whom we have seen standing by her through thick and thin), her character becomes entirely enigmatic. All the more so because of her entirely credible spoiled and narcissistic character — acting in the earlier part of Series 2, where political logic plays no apparent role whatsoever in her demeanor.

She is, not least, prepared to see the nuclear device detonated in Los Angeles because ultimately the devastation will serve many more people than those killed, maimed and bereaved, as she explains to her incredulous sister at a climactic moment. The conversation is the closest “24” takes us to understanding what makes the traitor-terrorist tick. She tells her sister their father works for the CIA. “So what?” replies her sister. “So what? Do you have any idea of what suffering they cause around the world?” retorts Marie. “[But]…you don’t want all those innocent people to die?” Kate says to her disbelievingly, and as Marie responds by threatening to shoot her, Kate doesn’t believe she will carry through. Marie: “I will. Because this is more important than your life. Or my life.” And when herself shot a moment later in the shoulder by Bauer, and subsequently interrogated by him, she snarls “Nobody is innocent in this country!”

In the final episode of Series 2 we see her chained in a perspex holding cage, with her father desperately trying to communicate with her through the perspex, to hear from her some explanation that can comfort him. She is entirely silent, almost autistic-seeming, bathed in bright light that makes her bleached hair wispy and renders her eyes in shadow and hence entirely opaque. Her whitened face is expression-less, a frozen mask, sharply contrasting with the grieved, shocked and horrified faces of her father and sister. The background music is quiet but eerie, a kind of aural representation of a strange and deeply terrifying alienation psychosis. Marie calls Kate back for a moment as she and her father are leaving, a brief little smile of vicious triumph crosses her face, and she says to Kate: “You think you’ll be safe out there? You won’t be.”
This scene is visually and aurally definitive. The domestically-reared terrorist is framed in ways quite similar to the depiction of American communists in McCarthy era Hollywood movies: completely devoid of human emotion, family warmth or estimable values, and prepared to sacrifice many millions for their horrific cause. These scenes and their accompanying dialogue pinpoint Marie as the ultimate alien, resonating with Osama bin Laden’s ideology of collective guilt, yet as “white-bread” as they come. This scenario connects to Bauer’s and President Palmer’s terroristic torture actions (see below), justified in the interests of saving multiple lives, but in “24’s” narrative these servants of the State are the retail terrorists, and Marie is the wholesale terrorist.

Terrorists and thugs who capture Bauer and members of his family are shown to be totally devoid of human feelings, killer-coyotes at best, sadistic monsters at worst. Bauer himself is injected with a heart-stopping substance to get him to talk (Series 2); terrorist Navi Araz shoots his brother without emotion, and is only by chance stopped from shooting his own teenage son (Series 4). Those trying to activate weapons of mass destruction only think in terms of vast casualties, some of them gloatingly. We know they are guilty up front, so their moral entitlement not to be tortured is narratively zero.

The foreign wholesale terrorists in many cases are acting out of absolute rage at the United States, and cannot be reasoned with. Their ambition is to see American streets “flowing with blood” (Series 6), to strike at “financial centers, transportation hubs, population centers” (Series 5). In the case of the “insider” terrorists, their motivations vary, from fury at having been mistreated as former counter-intelligence operatives (Saunders, Henderson), to politically highly-placed individuals (patriots-gone-bad) trying to sway the course of American policy rather than – as they see it – watch the USA be destroyed by wrong-headed policies. Thus in Series 6 Deputy Chief of Staff Reed Pollock tries to assassinate his President and a repentant terrorist leader, in order to stop both the ex-terrorist from broadcasting officially to the U.S. public, and to pin the President’s murder on him.

Torture. This plays a very major role throughout the series, clearly pivoting upon the “Dershowitz dilemma.” It also offers sadistic pleasures to viewers, with Bauer multiply tortured, smoke rising from his skin as he screams in pain (Series 2); with Bauer’s shoulder opened up and assaulted at its neural ganglion by a terrorist, and with another counter-terrorism operative assaulted repeatedly with an electric drill (Series 6). We watch several times a terrorist’s body are in agony under officially sponsored torture (Series 5). We also watch in unhappy or happy ghoulish fascination as staff of the counter-terrorism unit choke, their bodies thrash helplessly, and they die, through exposure to nerve gas (Series 4). As Sontag (2003: 41) observed, “It seems that the appetite for pictures showing bodies in pain is as keen, almost, as the desire for ones that show bodies naked.”

Two of the series’ unequivocal heroes themselves engage in torture for noble ends (cf. Andersen 2007: 297-298). Bauer is shown denying pain-medication and any medical assistance to a terrorist he has just shot in the shoulder, to try to compel her quickly to talk (Series 2), and in Series 5 shooting a terrorist’s wife in the leg and threatening to put a second bullet in her kneecap is to force her husband to talk. President Palmer is shown ordering electro-shock to get a member of his own
Cabinet to yield information about his co-plotters in planning the threatened detonation of a nuclear device in Los Angeles.

Central to the narrative of “24” are a series of highly time-sensitive situations, almost every one being of supreme urgency, leaving hardly any time to consider alternatives, and requiring drastic defensive action. “There’s no time for that!” is a frequently repeated line. Perhaps the limit is reached in Series 3 when Bauer amputates someone’s arm in order to block the spread of a deadly virus to the population at large. Each segment of each program starts and closes with a ticking clock, showing seconds as well as hours and minutes. The use of two, three and four split screens at the beginning and at commercial breaks through each episode, showing characters in each of the sub-plots, intensifies the sense of pace and urgency. Cell phones are everywhere and enable extreme rapidity of action – the series is an ongoing commercial for the merits of extensive National Security Agency surveillance. Ford SUVs reliably and swiftly - product placement in full gear - switch the players from one site to another. In the midst of all the mayhem, however, the worst expletive ever heard in the series is “Dammit!”, a remarkable acknowledgment of U.S. TV audiences’ sensitivity to cursing as contrasted with the series producers’ insensitivity to torture.

Prime virtues implicitly extolled in these situations are decisiveness, the readiness to opt for the least worst outcome, and the moral courage to swallow one’s own moral scruples. Both Jack Bauer and David Palmer exhibit these qualities, including the last, whereas by contrast many of those around them have no moral scruples to swallow. We are pitch-forked into situation after situation in which we have to trust Bauer and Palmer’s essential goodness and moral probity, and indeed must hope that their application of torture will do the trick in time. We end up invited to trust authority to deploy pain, though not in the abstract, only via the characters we have come to screen-know rather well and in whom we therefore have confidence. The targeted assassinations of Serb terrorists which are the prior backdrop to much of Series 1 are presented passingly, a bread-and-butter daily matter, without any hint that state power was being illegitimately deployed for overseas murder (the charge laid against Serbian president Milošević during the Bosnian civil war).

As a logical-ethical proposition, viewers may even find themselves corralled into subscribing to the narrative’s ethical priorities. But as always, it is essential to stand back and ask ourselves in how many cases, were we permitted to issue an opinion in the first place, would the shadowy figures in the world’s counterterrorist units be likely to pursue this hierarchy of values rather than others? And without seizing upon the innocent, as in Guantánamo, to prove they are hard at work solving the case? Particularly with the evidence of what we do know of their history around the world, why would we ever trust their values or judgment once they have virtually untrammeled power?

Fully to understand “24”’s narrative, however, requires more than a post-9/11 perspective. Profoundly enshrined in U.S. historical culture and nationalist imagery is the visual trope of encirclement by barbaric enemies, of being lethally imperiled (Downing 2007). This frame has been sedimented but also refreshed for at least four centuries, and in that sense 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s responses con-
stitute only the latest chapter in an ongoing imperialist nationalism born of fear, born of the manipulation of fear, and born of the experience of suffering retaliation for prior violence. There is still more involved at present in terms of the political economy of oil and other mineral deposits, in terms of Islamicist millenarianism, and still other factors, but this nationalist lens is crucial within the force field we inhabit.

**Conclusions**

The three nations discussed here have many more nuances and contradictions than it has been possible to engage with in this short space. So too in certain respects do their discourses and practices of politically-motivated violence. So also have been their media representations over time, whether in news or fiction. Nonetheless, there are certain key resonances. There is the arrogation of the term “terrorist” to cover only non-state political violence, plus its framing as unacceptable and therefore as justifying state repressive violence against non-combatants. There is the almost universal readiness to use civilian targets as legitimate while simultaneously lamenting that accidents are inevitable. There was in Britain and France for long the denial of the state’s torture practices, while in the USA they have in recent years been justified by the White House (while Jesuitically denying they can be described as torture), and legitimated, perhaps for many, via “24”. Perhaps “legitimated” may put it too strongly, and it would be more accurate to conceptualize the process as both the expansion of the U.S. and global public’s threshold of tolerance and our fascination with watching succulent violence.

Media which challenge these positions, or at least challenge their application to the given case, are rather rare. In the USA, *The New York Review of Books*, in France *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and in Britain *The Independent* and *The Guardian*, have been the most significant established media organs to operate as if they were actually independent of government on these issues. Otherwise, only radical small-scale media and internet networks have tried to introduce some light into a darkening public sphere.

Note: Earlier versions of this paper were delivered to the conference on Epidemics and Transborder Violence: Communication and Globalization, Hong Kong Baptist University, 2004; and to the 2006 Union for Democratic Communications conference, Florida Atlantic University.

**Notes**

Used Them All Before in Iraq,” The Guardian, April 19, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,939608,00.html. The British air force commandant in charge of this operation was the same man who designed the saturation bombings of German cities, Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.


4. http://www.thelancet.com/journal/vol364/iss9445/full/llan.364.9445/ (The Lancet, 10/29/04). This study showed the majority of Iraqi victims to have been women and children. A major part of the Bush Administration’s public rationale for attacking Iraq, and thus of the degree of public support it generated among ordinary Americans, was that it constituted a sustained act of vengeance and deterrence for 9/11. The objective was far larger, establishing a permanent U.S. bridgehead in the Gulf to establish U.S. domination of the unstable yet economically vital region. The construction of no less than fourteen U.S. military bases in Iraq clarified this purpose wonderfully. See Sami Ramdani, “Iraqis Told Them to Go from Day One,” The Guardian, April 9, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1188857,00.html.

5. For a detailed account of the successful censorship campaign launched against this exhibit, see Kai Bird & Lawrence Lifschitz, eds., Hiroshima’s Shadow. (Stony Creek, CT: The Pamphleteer’s Press, 1998).

6. Two articles by Tim Golden in The New York Times, “After terror, a secret rewriting of military law,” and “Threats and responses: tough justice” (October 24 and 25, 2004), described the exceptional secrecy in which a tightly knit small group of ultra-rightist Administration lawyers, overseen by Cheney and Rumsfeld, planned President Bush’s directive of November 13, 2001, which sanctioned extreme interrogation procedures in Guantánamo and elsewhere. From other sources we know these included techniques such as “water-boarding” and extremely violent assault groups.

7. Indeed, at least a couple of the agents at Abu Ghraib had previously served as private prison guards in the USA.


9. Estimates vary from one to two million Algerians forcibly herded into new settlements, mostly women and children, who by the close of the war were dying of malnutrition at the rate of 500 a day. See Yacine Tassadit, “Récéulations sur les ‘camps’ de la guerre d’Algérie.” Le Monde Diplomatique (February 2004), http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/02/TASSADIT/11020. The resonance with the U.S. “pacified hamlets” strategy in the Vietnam war is quite striking.

10. The extreme violence unleashed in Algeria in the decade following the abrogated 1992 national elections, costing between one and two hundred thousand lives, while still too shrouded in official shadows to be able to characterize with complete confidence, is a further part of the story connected with France, given the very close continuing relations between the Algerian and French

11. For an outstanding discussion of these issues in the British context of the time, see Schlesinger 1991, chapters 1-4.


14. By terrorists I designate those who attack civilian targets.

15. Literally, the Black Feet, a term of derision aimed at the descendants of dirt-poor farmers from France and Spain who had been settled in Algeria in the 19th century.

16. Arab Algerians, who had served in considerable numbers in the French army, and thus were defined as the ultimate traitors, worse still than the pieds-noirs, by the post-revolution regime.

17. Notably, the largely Algerian-resident Paris demonstration in favor of Algerian independence of October 17th, 1961, in which the police (under the direction of the then city police chief, ex-Nazi collaborator Maurice Papon, who would eventually be put on trial for his crimes during the Nazi era) executed out of hand several hundred Algerian demonstrators and threw their corpses into the Seine. The evident solidarity of feeling between the Paris police and the OAS needs no further comment. This episode has been the subject of numerous publications and demonstrations in recent years, but once again has not benefited from any official investigation to the time of writing.


References


Bamber, David & Alasdair Palmer. “UK Forces ‘Aided Ulster Loyalists.’” *The Age*


John Downing is Director of the Global Media Research Center in the College of Mass Communication and Media Arts, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA. His most recent book is *Representing 'Race': Racisms, Ethnicities and Media*, co-authored with Charles Husband (Sage Publications, 2005). He is currently under contract to edit a one-volume encyclopedia of social movement media, and is an editor of the new journal *Global Media and Communication*. 